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Executive Summary
This report presents new evidence relating to the effects of climate policy in Europe, particularly
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The evidence is based on new data from
almost 800 phone interviews we conducted with managers in manufacturing plants in six European
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK. The interview design follows an
innovative method that has recently emerged in the study of management practices and that mitigates
well-known biases found in more conventional survey designs such as paper-based or web-based
questionnaires. The principal feature of this technique is to involve the respondents in an open dialog,
rather than asking them to choose from a set of pre-formulated responses. Responses are translated
into ordinal performance scores by trained analysts using a detailed benchmark for each score. This
method combines the richness and flexibility of an interview-based approach often adopted in case
studies with a standardized measurement format that allows us to perform statistical hypothesis tests
in a representative sample of firms. We guaranteed participants strict confidentiality of their responses
to elicit truthful information on politically contentious issues such as the impact of climate change
policy.
This report describes the interview design in detail and summarises the responses. For further anal-
ysis, we link the interview data with company data from a range of secondary sources including
transaction data from the official EU ETS registry and performance data from both commercial and
government sources. We use the combined data to analyse three aspects of the EU ETS in depth,
namely (i) the behaviour of firms in the EU ETS, (ii) the vulnerability of firms in terms of negative
impacts on employment and carbon leakage, along with an assessment of how well the proposed EU
legislation to protect vulnerable firms does at identifying them, and (iii) alternative criteria for the
allocation of free emission permits during the next phase of the EU ETS.
Firms in the EU ETS Our analysis shows that firms in phase I of the EU ETS did not consider
the policy to be very stringent on average. Economists often take for granted that firms make rational
decisions based on a comparison of the allowance price and their marginal abatement cost. In contrast,
we find evidence suggestive of a “compliance mentality” among firms. About 30% of firms participate
only passively in the ETS. This raises the concern that some firms with excess amounts of permits
do not make them available to other market participants, thus raising the overall compliance cost. On
average firms start to sell only if they have an excess supply of about 5000 permits. However, since
firms with less than 5000 permits hold less than 10% of all excess permits, their reluctance to sell
excess permits should not have had a large impact on the permit price.
Vulnerability to carbon leakage While full permit auctioning in phase III of the EU ETS is en-
visaged as the general rule, European lawmakers have recently published criteria for establishing that
a sector is at significant risk of carbon leakage and hence entitled to free emission permits. These
criteria are based on a sector’s carbon and trade intensities. We examine the empirical content of
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these criteria and analyse their economic implications. We show that about half of the firms in our
interview sample are “at risk” according to these criteria and hence entitled to free permits in phase
III. We assess the accuracy of the Commission’s criteria by examining their correlation with a score
measuring the future impact of climate policy, which we construct from the interview responses. We
argue that ours is a more direct measure of the detrimental policy impact that the Commission is
trying to capture using carbon and trade intensities. Moreover, we show that this score is consistent
with other, perhaps more objective, interview responses that capture exposure to climate policy, such
as the degree of product market competition and the ability to pass on cost increases to customers.
We find a statistically significant positive correlation of the future impact score with carbon intensity
but not with trade intensity. However it is the latter criterion that accounts for the largest number
of exemptions from permit auctioning. Hence, a large number of permits is given away for free to
firms to firms that are not at risk. We calculate that a modification of the thresholds for exemption
could increase the amount of permits that could be auctioned from about 40% to 60% while having
a minimal impact on the risk of carbon leakage. At an allowance price of C30, we estimate that this
could increase annual auction revenues by C7 billion.
Criteria for permit allocation A conceptual problem with sector-level criteria for free permit al-
location is that they cannot account for heterogeneity within sectors. We document that there are a
number of firms with rather high impact scores in sectors not exempt from auctioning whereas many
firms that will be given permits for free reported no detrimental impact of climate change policy at
all. This suggests that support to vulnerable firms could be provided in a more efficient way. We
develop general principles of an efficient permit allocation at the firm level, based on the idea that
permits should be allocated to firms where the last free permit has the strongest impact on the relo-
cation decision. We derive optimal permit allocations in two ways, either by minimising free permits
subject to a fixed level of leakage risk or by minimising leakage risk subject to a fixed number of free
permits. We find that the leakage risk incurred under full grandfathering of all firms could be achieved
by allocating 70-90% fewer free permits. In turn, given the total amount of permits the EU plans to
hand out for free in phase III, we estimate that a simple reallocation across firms would decrease
the expected emission leakage by more than 30% and the expected number of jobs at risk by more
than 60%. In regards to the practical implementation of our scheme to improve permit allocation, we
explore a strategy based on observable and objectively measurable firm characteristics.
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1 Introduction
The reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is an increasingly important policy objective for
many governments. In particular, the member states of the European Union (EU) have been pushing
for climate change policies more strongly than the rest of the world. The EU’s flagship policy instru-
ment is the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) which imposes an overall cap on
CO2 emissions of the power sector as well as on large industrial emitters. It also provides a framework
for trading permits between different emitters and third parties. In theory, the cap-and-trade system
ensures that the total costs of abating CO2 emissions are minimised.
While establishing a cap creates certainty about the total amount of emissions, it leaves open how
much it will cost firms to keep their emissions below the cap. In setting the cap, policy makers are
thus concerned that they might impose too high a cost on the regulated emitters. The problem is
exacerbated if – as is the case with the EU ETS – most other countries are not imposing similar
policies so that market shares of regulated firms could be threatened by foreign competitors who are
not subject to this regulation. In the extreme case, regulated firms could re-locate to locations outside
the EU in order to dodge the regulation. As a result of this “carbon leakage”, regulated countries
face an excess burden of regulation in the form of job losses and diminished environmental benefits
as global reductions of GHG emissions would fall short of the levels targeted by the regulation. To
mitigate this risk, the EU has been using the practice of allocating permits for free to sectors deemed
at a heightened risk of leakage.
Deciding which firms or sectors are at risk is not easy, however. The matter is complicated by the
fact that the best informed actors – i.e. the regulated firms – face an incentive to exaggerate the actual
costs of compliance in order to extract more rents in the form of free permits or to lobby for a more
lenient overall cap. Free permit allocation has therefore followed simple but fairly ad hoc rules. In
the past, permits were by and large allocated on the basis of historic emissions. For trading phase III
of the EU ETS starting in 2013, the EU Commission plans to exempt from auctioning sectors that
exceed certain thresholds in terms of emissions or trade intensity, or both. As these thresholds are set
ad hoc, there is a risk that firms receive free permits even if they are not at risk of leakage. Conversely,
it might be the case that firms that are actually at risk do not receive sufficient free permits.
Against this background, we conducted interviews with approximately 800 firms across six Euro-
pean countries with two principal objectives, namely (i) to gather new evidence on the actual risk
of downsizing due to climate policies and how it relates to the criteria used by regulators and (ii)
to elicit information on other aspects of firm performance related to emissions and climate change
policies, including the behaviour of firms on the EU ETS market. The interview setup follows an
innovative method developed recently in the study of management practices (Bloom and van Reenen,
2007; Bloom et al., 2009, 2010) with the aim to mitigate various types of biases that typically emerge
in more conventional survey designs. The principal feature is to involve the participants in an open
dialog rather than to have them choose from a set of pre-formulated responses. Responses are trans-
lated into ordinal performance scores by trained analysts using a detailed benchmark for each score.
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The richness and flexibility of an interview based approach which features among the main strengths
of the case study method can thus be combined with the ability to test more general hypotheses based
on a representative sample of firms using econometric techniques. The method also allows us to
elicit less biased information on politically contentious issues such as the impact of climate change
policy. A further innovation in our approach is that we are able to link the interview data with com-
pany data from a range of secondary data sources such as the official EU ETS registry (known as the
Community Independent Transactions Log, CITL) and with company performance data from both
commercial and government sources.
To assess the risk of carbon leakage we discussed with firm managers their expectations about future
climate change policies, how stringent such policies are perceived to be and if they have any plans for
downsizing in response to such policies. We also discussed the impact of free permit allocations for
firms that are part of the EU ETS. This revealed that for the largest fraction of firms, climate policies
implemented so far did not require any deviations from “business as usual”. The majority of firms in
the EU ETS expect some minor adjustments to keep within the targets set in trading phase III after
2012.
We correlate this measure of leakage risk derived from the interview responses with the EU’s criteria
for free permit allocation, namely the sectors’ carbon emission intensity and trade intensity. We find
that while carbon intensity is a very good predictor of actual impact as measured by our measure,
trade intensity is not. Yet under current plans of the Commission, most exemptions from auctioning
would be granted on the basis of the trade intensity criterion alone. We calculate that by auctioning
permits rather than giving them to firms whose leakage risk is not larger than that of non-exempt
firms, European governments could raise additional revenue on the order of C7 billion every year.
We then develop a new framework to allocate permits efficiently. This is based on the simple but so
far unappreciated economic logic that free permits should be given to those firms where they have
the highest marginal impact on aggregate CO2 leakage or job risk. Using data from our survey, we
show that this marginal impact varies substantially between sectors and is not necessarily correlated
with absolute impacts. We develop an algorithm that minimises the aggregate risk of either job loss
or CO2 leakage for a given amount of permits to be allocated for free. Simulations show that a much
lower risk can be achieved through optimal allocation even when compared to a situation where all
permits are handed out for free. We also consider the dual problem of minimising the number of
permits handed out for free while constraining the aggregate risk. We find that the aggregate risk
arising with free allocation could be achieved with a much lower fraction of permits being handed out
for free. The mismatch between optimal and actual allocations is particularly severe when it comes to
minimising the risk to jobs. This means that current plans by the Commission do too little to mitigate
the risk to jobs that arises from the EU ETS.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on the effects of
the EU ETS on firm behaviour and competitiveness. Section 3 discusses the methodology underlying
our telephone interviews in more detail. Section 4 provides a variety of descriptive statistics on the
7
various survey variables. We look at these variables separately for ETS and non-ETS firms, between
different sectors as well as countries. Section 5 presents and discusses a number of results on the
behaviour of firms in the EU ETS. Section 6 contains an evaluation of the EU Commission’s suggested
criteria for deciding if a sector is vulnerable to job losses or carbon leakage due to climate change
policy. Section 7 introduces our framework for an optimised permit allocation process. Section 8
concludes.
2 Literature review
There is a growing literature analysing different aspects of the EU ETS and seeking to evaluate its
effects on GHG abatement, employment , and international competitiveness. In what follows, we
provide a brief review of this literature, giving more room to studies in the specific areas investigated
here, namely the behaviour of ETS firms in the allowance market and the competitiveness effects.
Survey studies Surveys have been a common tool in the empirical analysis of the EU ETS since
its beginnings, which is due in part to the initial lack of official data suitable for qualitative and
quantitative analyses. Already in the summer of 2005 the EU Commission commissioned a mail
survey among stake holders (see McKinsey and Ecofys, 2005). Among the 302 respondents were 167
industrial companies (including the power sector). Half of them reported that they added the cost of
CO2 allowances on to their product prices. About the same number of companies reported that carbon
prices had a medium to strong impact on their long-term strategy and innovative activity. A majority
of companies preferred long-term allocation rules (10-years and up) which reduce policy uncertainty
and are more compatible with time frames for capital investment. Regarding future allocation rules,
there was strong opposition against more auctioning after 2012, while benchmarking was considered
feasible. Participants also favored an EU wide harmonization of the ETS allocation rules concerning
new entrants and closures.
More recently, Kenber et al. (2009) interviewed senior managers of 9 large companies, 6 of which
belonged to the ETS. They find that to date, the EU ETS has not resulted in significant costs to busi-
ness, especially when compared to the impact of other factors such as energy price fluctuations and
the economic downturn. While carbon prices are acknowledged in company decision-making, they
have not induced a fundamental shift in strategy such as relocation or a reduction of the workforce.
For the energy-intensive aluminum industry, there is however a noticeable indirect effect of carbon
pricing through electricity prices. While heavy industrial emitters have fared well so far relative to
their non-EU competitors, some of them fear possible competitive impacts in phase III of the EU ETS
beginning in 2013.
Allocation At the core of any cap-and-trade scheme is the mechanism that determines the initial
allocation of permits. Due to the multilateral nature of the EU ETS, the allocation process involves
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two dimensions, namely the allocation across countries and across sectors. Another fundamental
aspect is whether permits are granted for free or at some cost, e.g. via a permit auction. Unless permits
are auctioned off, a further decision has to be made on the micro-allocation of permits among firms
within a sector. Under the EU ETS phases I and II, the cap is set in a decentralized way. Countries are
called upon to draw up National Allocation Plans (NAP)s that both fix the national cap and determine
the sectoral allocation. Ellerman et al. (2007) give a detailed account of the development of the NAPs
under phase I in 10 European countries. The authors conclude that the principles applied by national
governments have been rather consistent, as most opted for free permit allocations based on existing
emissions. NAPs submitted for phase II exhibit more stringent caps but retain the allocation scheme.
While there will be some more use of auctioning during phase II, it remains far short of what is
allowed and the use of benchmarking still remains the exception (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
Apart from distributional aspects, there are important dynamic effects of a permit allocation scheme
that derive from the treatment of installations that close and of new entrants. Åhman et al. (2007)
analyse how the treatment of closures and entrants differs across EU Member States. They argue
that the common practice of free allowances are inconsistent with general guidelines issued by the
European Commission aiming to avoid distortions of firms’ compliance behaviour. Åhman et al.
propose stronger EU guidance regarding closures and new entrants, a more precise compensation
criterion on which to justify free allocations, and a mechanism to guide a transition from current
practice to an approach that places greater weight on efficiency.
Performance As official data on emission trading has become available, researchers have used
resources such as the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) to evaluate the effectiveness
of the EU ETS at reducing carbon emissions. The main difficulty with assessing the performance is
to distinguish between real abatement and “over-allocation”, i.e. an excess permit allocations larger
than business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) construct an index of over-
allocation by dividing the net of all long and short positions in an aggregate (a sector or country)
by the absolute sum of all long and short positions. They use this index to identify countries where
over-allocation was likely. In order to compute sectoral CO2 abatement, these authors first compute
a counter factual emission scenario extrapolating pre-ETS CO2 emissions using data on GDP growth
and trends in CO2 intensity. In a second step they subtract actual emissions in phase I from counter
factual emissions and obtain a tentative estimate of 130-220 Mt of CO2 abated annually in 2005 and
2006. In a counter factual simulation for the power sector, Delarue and D’haeseleer (2007) obtain
point estimates of 88 Mt and 59 Mt for the same respective years. Ellerman et al. (2010) use a macro
approach as well as data on the electric utility sector to show the effectiveness of the EU ETS at
reducing carbon emissions. In sum, there is some evidence that the EU ETS resulted in positive
abatement even though the emission caps in phase I turned out not to be binding. Emission caps in
phase II have been more ambitious so that the risk of over-allocation has been substantially reduced
(Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
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Competitiveness A natural consequence of the implementation of the EU ETS is that firms in the
ETS face higher carbon prices than their competitors outside the EU who are not subject to compara-
ble regulation. This has led to worries about a possible loss of competitiveness of European industry.
In this context, a loss of competitiveness is generally thought of as a loss of output and employment.
Output declines because firms reallocated resources in order to comply with the ETS but also because
of industry relocation to places outside the ETS member states. The latter effect is called production
leakage. To the extent that production outside is more carbon intensive than within the ETS coun-
tries, there is also a carbon leakage effect in that carbon abatement inside the ETS is offset in part by
increased emissions elsewhere.
A widespread approach to assessing these effects has been to calibrate computable general equilib-
rium models that are capable of predicting the consequences of differential carbon pricing across
regions and the resulting carbon leakage. Most models of the first generation (with exogenous techni-
cal change) predict moderate leakage rates between 5 and 35% for the Kyoto Protocol commitments
(Paltsev, 2001).
Another strand of research conducts ex ante analyses of the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS
with particular attention to sectoral detail. McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) anticipate that the electric
power sector benefits in the short and medium term, whereas the pulp and paper, and the steel indus-
tries experience detrimental effects on production. The effect on refining is neutral whereas the effect
on cement could be positive or negative, depending on local patterns of competition that may or may
not allow producers to pass through the cost of compliance. Primary aluminium production, though
not directly regulated under phase I, is expected to be affected by higher electricity costs. Reinaud
(2005) concludes that this sector is the most adversely affected by carbon prices given its high levels
of electricity consumption and pass-through of carbon prices to electricity prices. Other industries
with expected cost increases include the cement, newsprint and steel industries. In sum, these studies
conclude that competitiveness effects are moderate as long as permit allocation is free of charge. As
a larger share of permits will be auctioned in the future, the most energy intensive industries will be
at risk of a competitiveness loss. Grubb et al. (2009) argue that such detrimental competitiveness
impacts are limited to a small number of industry sectors.
A common aspect of the aforementioned studies is that they undertake ex ante evaluations of the
competitiveness effects based on simulations or on analysis of ad-hoc criteria and statistics.1 Because
of the direct cost impact of environmental regulation, these studies predict that the competitiveness
effects are likely to be negative, although this is not uniformly the case across sectors (see the survey
by Oberndorfer et al., 2006). When the EU ETS is compared to alternative ways of implementing the
Kyoto targets, it is often the case that adverse effects on competitiveness are offset by the efficiency
gains from permit trade.
Few ex post evaluation studies of the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS have been completed to
1For example Grubb et al. (2009) look at carbon intensity and trade intensity. While plausible arguments can be
constructed why these statistics are related to leakage risk there is no direct evidence of such a link. We come back to this
issue in Section 6 below.
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date. Demailly and Quirion (2008) and Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) study the impact of the EU ETS
on production and profitability for the iron and steel industry and for in a sample of German firms,
respectively. The former study finds modest competitiveness losses and wheras the latter finds no
significant impact on revenues and employment of the regulated firms . Aldy and Pizer (2009) conduct
an empirically based simulation study to estimate the magnitude of carbon leakage in response to a
15$/ton of CO2 price. They use panel data on output, employment, net imports and energy prices
for more than 400 4-digit SIC-72 industries in US manufacturing between 1986 and 1994 to identify
the energy price elasticities of output and net imports. Subsequently they compute an estimate of
carbon leakage as the difference between the simulated effects of carbon pricing on production and
consumption, respectively. They find that a 15$ carbon price would lead on average to a 1.3% decline
in production but also 0.6% decline in consumption, leaving the net leakage effect at 0.7%. There is
no statistically discernible effect on employment for the manufacturing sectors as a whole.
3 Interviewing managers
3.1 Interview design
Our survey builds upon and substantially extends previous work on climate change policies and man-
agement practices by Martin et al. (2010). We conduct structured telephone interviews with managers
at randomly selected manufacturing facilities in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the
UK. The interview setup follows the management survey design pioneered by Bloom and van Reenen
(2007) in that the interviewer engages interviewees in a dialogue with open questions. On the basis
of this dialogue, the interviewer then assesses and ranks the company along various dimensions. We
adopt a double-blind strategy: interviewees do not know that their answers are being scored by the
interviewers and interviewers do not know performance characteristics of the firm they are interview-
ing.2 This interview format is designed to avoid several sources of bias common in conventional
surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). For instance, experimental evidence shows that a respon-
dent’s answers can be manipulated by making simple changes to the ordering of questions, to the
way questions are framed, or to the scale on which respondents are supposed to answer. By asking
open-ended questions and by delegating the task of scoring the answers to the interviewer, we seek
to minimize cognitive bias of this type. Possible cognitive bias on the part of the interviewers can be
controlled for by using interviewer fixed effects in the regression analyses.
Another common observation with survey data is that respondents are tempted to report attitudes or
patterns of behaviour that are socially desirable but may not reflect what they actually think and do.
This problem may be exacerbated in situations where respondents do not have a firm attitude towards
the issues they are asked about but are reluctant to admit that. Our research design addresses this issue
2Interviews were carried out by graduate and postgraduate students after they had been trained. The interviewers were
paid according to the number of interviews conducted, encouraging them to do more interviews and discouraging any firm
background research, thus preserving the double-blind nature of the survey.
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in two ways. First, the interviewer starts by asking an open question about an issue and then follows
up with more specific questions, or asks for examples in order to evaluate the respondent’s answer
as precisely as possible. Second, the results of the interviews are then linked to independent data on
economic performance as a validation exercise.
3.2 Interview practice
3.2.1 Sampling frame
Using the ORBIS database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk3 we obtained contact details for 44,605
manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK. We randomly se-
lected companies from that list to solicit an interview. To ensure sufficient coverage of firms subject
to the EU ETS (hereafter, EU ETS firms) we also sampled manufacturing firms at random from the
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) in these countries.
3.2.2 Obtaining an interview
Interviewers made “cold calls” to production facilities (not head offices), gave their name and affil-
iation with the London School of Economics and then asked to be put through to the production or
environmental manager. In the case of EU ETS firms, interviewers asked for the person responsible
for the EU ETS. In some cases we had the name of this person from the CITL. At this stage, the
terms “survey” and “research” were avoided as both are associated with commercial market research
and some switchboard operators have instructions to reject such calls. Instead, we told them that we
are doing “a piece of work” on climate change policies and their impact on competitiveness in the
business sector and would like to have a conversation with the manager best informed.
Once the manager was on the phone, the interviewer asked whether he or she would be willing to have
a conversation of about 40-45 minutes about these issues. Depending on the manager’s willingness
and availability to do so, an interview was scheduled. If the manager refused, he or she was asked
to provide the interviewer with another knowledgeable contact at the firm who might be willing to
comment. Managers who agreed to give an interview were sent an email with a letter in PDF format
to confirm the date and time of the interview, to provide background information and assure them of
confidentiality. A similar letter was sent to managers who requested additional information before
scheduling an interview.
3.2.3 Scoring
An ordinal scale from 1 to 5 was adopted to measure various management practices related to climate
change. For each aspect of management ranked in this way (see section 3.3for a detailed description)
interviewers were instructed to ask a number of open questions. Questions were ordered such that
3See http://www.bvdep.com
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the interviewer started with a fairly open question about a topic and then probed for more details in
subsequent questions, if necessary. We provided exemplary responses that interviewers could consult
when in doubt about giving a high versus a mid and a low score for the relevant dimension. The goal
was to benchmark the practices of firms according to a few common criteria. For instance, rather than
asking the manager for a subjective assessment of the management’s awareness of climate change
issues we gauged this by how formal and far-reaching the discussion of climate change topics is in
current management. For consistency checks of interviewer scoring, a subset of randomly selected
interviews were double-scored by a second team member who listened in.
3.2.4 Data collection
All interviewers worked on computers with an internet connection and used VOIP software to conduct
the interviews.4 They accessed a central interview database via a custom-built secure web interface
that we programmed very similarly to Martin et al. (2010). The web interface included a scheduling
tool and an interview screen with hyperlinks to a manual that provided the analysts with background
information on each question . Interviewers scored answers during the interview. For all interviews,
the scheduling history as well as the exact time and date, duration, identity of interviewer etc. were
recorded. All interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s native language.
3.3 Interview scope
The survey seeks to gather information on both the effectiveness and the competitiveness effects of
climate change policies, particularly of the EU ETS, in a random sample of European manufacturing
firms. The questionnaire (see appendix B) is divided in four sections. The first section examines the
current and anticipated future effects of the EU ETS. The second section deals with prices for energy
and CO2, competition and other external drivers of climate change related management practices. The
third section inquires about specific measures that were adopted by firms and those that were consid-
ered but eventually discarded. The last section gathers information on relevant firm characteristics.
We discuss the questions in more detail in the following paragraphs.
3.3.1 Drivers
EU ETS impact, rationality of market behaviour and anticipation of phase III We started each
interview with a specific module of questions regarding EU ETS participation which we asked the
respondent to answer for a particular site.5 In order to assess the stringency of the EU ETS, we asked
the manager to describe, using examples, how difficult it is to comply with their emissions reduction
target. For example, a low score would be business as usual whereas a high score would be justified
by a fundamental change in the production process, or fuel switching, for example.
4A video clip showing interviewers at work is available online at http://www.eco.uc3m.es/~uwagner/McETS.mov
5For non-ETS firms, interviewers skipped directly to the“Awareness” section explained below.
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Moreover, we sought to get a sense of whether the trading system has been fully understood as an
economic tool that can be used to minimize compliance costs. We used two alternative routes to ac-
complish this, namely by asking specific (i.e. not open) questions about trading behaviour on the per-
mit market including frequency, net balance, banking and borrowing of European Union Allowances
(EUAs). We also asked an open question about how trading decisions are taken within the firm and
assessed the response against a set of showcase behaviours characterized by an increasing degree of
sophistication.
Finally, we asked firms about their expectations of the stringency of phase III of the EU ETS to begin
in 2013. A low score was given if respondents did not expect the stringency of phase III to divert
them from business as usual activities and choices, whereas the highest score was given to firms that
expected strong sanctions, extensive use of auctioning and very stringent targets to prevail during
phase III.
Awareness We started with a question about the management’s awareness of climate change issues.
A medium score reflects some evidence of a formal discussion, e.g. that this has been on the agenda of
a management meeting. EU ETS firms were thus given at least a score of 3 on a scale from 1 to 5 due
to the fact that they are insitutionally bound to participate in European level climate change policy.
A high score was given only when it was evident that the management had studied the implications
of climate change in detail and had integrated their findings into the strategic business plan. We
also recorded if climate change and related policy were perceived as having a positive impact on the
business.
Price expectations and impacts We asked managers about their expectations regarding energy and
carbon prices by 2020. We recorded a band for such prices, e.g. answers such as “somewhere between
20 and 100 Euros per ton of CO2” were possible and put bounds on the amount of uncertainty. We also
asked about the impacts of different carbon prices on output and employment at the given production
site. Specifically, we inquired about plans for outsourcing or closure in the near future and the role of
climate policy and carbon price levels in such plans.
Competitive pressure Firms were asked to describe the geographic distribution of their competitors
(home country, EU, rest of world) and more specifically the location of the head offices and production
sites of their main competitor. Further, we inquired about the shares of production exported within
the EU and to the rest of the world, respectively. We also asked them to estimate the percentage of an
increase in energy or carbon prices which they could pass on to their customers in order to understand
the market structure of the industries these firms compete in.
Other drivers We asked about the role of consumers in driving management decisions relevant to
climate change. If told that consumers demand climate friendly products and practice, the interviewer
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gauged the extent of the pressure by inquiring about the information that customers demand (e.g. a
mere label vs. hard data on GHG emissions). We distinguish between firms whose customers are
businesses or final consumers. In order to determine whether management regards climate change
and related policy as a business opportunity we asked whether the firm sells climate change related
products and tried to gauge their importance in overall revenue. Related to this, we inquired about the
importance of innovation in such products.
3.3.2 Measures
Monitoring and targets The first set of questions related to a firm’s rigor in monitoring its energy
use and GHG emissions. Monitoring can range from a glance at the energy bill (lowest score) to
detailed monitoring of both energy use and carbon flows embodied in the firms products and inter-
mediate goods. Highest scores were given to firms that used objective (external) agents to verfiy their
energy/GHG accounting. If monitoring was in place, we asked whether management was given spe-
cific targets for energy use and for GHG emissions. We inquired about the stringency of such targets
and the incentives provided to achieve them.
Measures to reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions We inquired about concrete mea-
sures taken on site to reduce GHG emissions and invited the manager to discuss in more detail the
measure that had the biggest impact. The answers were not scored but classified according to the
part of the production site it affected (heating and cooling, power generation, machinery, energy man-
agement, among others). We also recorded how the firm had learned about the measure and what
motivated its adoption.
Mindful of the debate about the “energy efficiency gap” we asked managers about the reasons for
not adopting a measure they had considered at some point and that would have enhanced energy
efficiency.6 We record the pay-back criterion as well as other factors if they were relevant.
Moving beyond adoption, we inquired about the intensity of process innovation related to climate
change and energy on the production site. We also included a question about hypothetical further
reductions in GHG emissions imposing either (i) economic viability or (ii) technical feasibility re-
gardless of cost.
Management Previous research on energy efficiency points to a possible effect of organization
structure on management of climate change issues (DeCanio, 1993; DeCanio et al., 2000; Martin
et al., 2010). We collected information on the title and responsibilities of the highest-ranking manager
dealing with climate change and energy issues. We also asked how many levels separate this manager
from the CEO in the managerial hierarchy, and whether any aspects of this position had changed
recently.
6The energy effieicency gap is generally described as the gap between a firm’s actual energy use and its optimal energy
use.
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Country specific measures Each country module of the interview script contained a few country
specific questions regarding national policies related to climate change. We asked firms whether they
were subject to or participated in those policy schemes and how stringent they found them.
3.3.3 Firm characteristics
At the end of each interview, we went through a set of questions about firm characteristics that we
wish to use as control variables. In particular, we collect information on firm size (global, national
and local) in terms of employment, number of business sites and ownership. We also asked the
manager about environmental indicators, such as the energy bill and energy cost share, renewable
power purchases, and adoption of environmental management systems (ISO 14000 / ISO 14001) .
Finally, we record characteristics of the interviewee, such as gender, the position held, tenure in the
position held and within the firm, and educational background.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Sample characteristics
To construct our sampling frame, we downloaded ORBIS data for all manufacturing firms with more
than 50 employees in each of the six countries in our study. Possible interview partners were drawn
at random from this database and contacted via phone, sometimes repeatedly, until an interview ma-
terialized or the firm explicitly refused to participate. We contacted a total of 1,451 firms in the six
countries and interviewed 770 firms, thus obtaining a response rate of 52%. We deliberately oversam-
pled EU ETS firms by drawing firms at random from the CITL. As a result, 438 (57%) of interviewed
managers were working for firms participating in the EU ETS. Scheduling of interviews began in late
August and the last interviews were given in early November of 2009. The bulk of interviews were
conducted in September and October of 2009.
It is important for the rest of our analysis to show that our sample is not biased. EU ETS firms are
different from non-ETS firms, but within these two categories, interviewed firms are not significantly
different from non-interviewed firms in regards to the observable characteristics used in our analysis.
Panel A of Table 1 shows regressions for each of the principal firm characteristics available from the
ORBIS database (turnover, employment, materials, and capital) on an dummy variable indicating that
a firm is part of the EU ETS, a dummy indicating that a firm was contacted and a full set of sector and
year dummies. The estimated coefficients are small and statistically insignificant in all regressions
except for materials. For the set of firms that either conceded or refused an interview, we ran anal-
ogous regressions to estimate an intercept specific to firms that granted us an interview. The results
in Panel B of Table 1 show that none of these intercepts is statistically significant. We thus conclude
that our sample is representative of the underlying population of medium-sized manufacturing firms
in the six European countries covered by our study.
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Table 1: Sample representativeness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
turnover materials
A. All firms
   firm contacted -0.0322 -0.0794 0.172 -0.272***
(0.0786) (0.0611) (0.108) (0.0807)
   EU ETS firm 2.031*** 1.452*** 2.530*** 2.009***
(0.0948) (0.0796) (0.145) (0.185)
   number of observations 118874 107830 113771 15563
   number of firms 12322 12921 11118 2284
   R-squared      0.511 0.364 0.513 0.356
B. Contacted firms
   firm granted interview -0.0983 -0.0373 0.0443 0.195
(0.118) (0.0957) (0.150) (0.152)
   EU ETS firm 2.044*** 1.547*** 2.540*** 2.069***
(0.124) (0.107) (0.160) (0.270)
   number of observations 26114 23933 25815 3662
   number of firms 1373 1420 1297 425
   R-squared      0.659 0.589 0.618 0.689
employment capital 
Notes: Regressions in panel A are based on the entire set of manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees  contained in ORBIS for the 
six countries covered by the survey. Each column shows the results from a regression of the ORBIS variable given in the column head on a 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm was contacted or not and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm was taking part in the EU 
ETS at the time of the interviewing. Panel B shows analogous regressions for the set of contacted companies and with an indicator for 
whether an interview was granted. All regressions are by OLS and include country dummies, year dummies and 3-digit sector dummies. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2: Interview response rates by country
Refused
Belgium 134 131 89 42 178 47 0.74
France 141 140 92 48 238 98 0.59
Germany 139 138 98 40 337 199 0.41
Hungary 69 69 37 32 90 21 0.77
Poland 78 78 61 17 140 62 0.56
UK 209 204 61 143 468 264 0.44
Total 770 760 438 322 1451 691 0.52
# of 
Interviews
# of Firms 
Interviewed
 # of ETS 
Firms 
Interviewed
# of Non 
ETS Firms 
Interviewed
Total Firms 
Contacted
Response 
Rate
Notes: There are more interviews than interviewed firms as we conducted several interviews with different partners in a
small number of firms.
Table 2 provides an overview of the number of interviews and the response rates broken down by
country and by EU ETS participation status. All analysts would first conduct interviews in the UK
and only then go on to conduct interviews in another country, hence the larger number of interviews
for this country. This practice allows us to separately identify dummies for country and interviewer,
which control for interviewer bias as discussed previously. The last column shows the response rate,
calculated as the ratio of interviews granted and the number of firms that were contacted. Response
rates vary somewhat between countries. For example, they are particularly low in Germany (41%)
and the UK (44%), whereas in Belgium or Hungary firms were more willing to participate (74 and
77%, respectively). Generally, these figures are very high compared to response rates achieved in
postal or online surveys.
Table 3 summarizes interview statistics and response rates broken down by industrial sector, showing
that in the majority of sectors, the response rate is above 50%.
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the full sample of interviewed firms.
This shows that we have a rather well stratified sample with firm age ranging from younger than 5
years and to older than 95 years and firm size ranging from less than 84 employees to more than 1900
employees.
Table 5 compares the sample means of each characteristic between EU ETS firms and non EU ETS
firms. It also reports the results from a test of equality of means between those groups. We can see
that EU ETS firms are systematically different from non EU ETS firms in that they are older and
larger in terms of either employment or turnover. They also appear more profitable.
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Table 3: Interview response rates by industry
Cement 66 57 9 97 68%
Ceramics 13 6 7 17 76%
Chemical & Plastic 125 67 58 240 52%
Fabricated Metals 47 7 40 113 42%
Food/Tobacco 110 71 39 208 53%
Fuels 16 16 0 25 64%
34 11 23 105 32%
Glass 33 32 1 70 47%
Iron & Steel 42 32 10 63 67%
78 13 65 180 43%
Other basic metals 11 8 3 21 52%
Publishing 24 6 18 54 44%
11 4 7 28 39%
Textile/Leather 21 12 9 50 42%
Vehicles 49 25 24 82 60%
Wood & Paper 91 72 19 171 53%
Other minerals 8 7 1 15 53%
Total 779 446 333 1539 51%
# of Firms 
Interviewed
 # of ETS 
Firms 
Interviewed
# of Non ETS 
Firms 
Interviewed
Total Firms 
Contacted
Response 
Rate
Furniture/nec
Machinary & Optics
TVCommunication
Table 4: Firm characteristics
Percentiles
Variable Mean
Age of company 103 355 5 23 95 750
Turnover (Millions of EUR) 485.31 2,772.05 10.09 77.72 786.24 699
Firm's number of employees 1,024 3,885 84 300 1,901 702
Earnings before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) (Millions of EUR) 16.80 81.11 -1.85 2.42 44.94 685
Number of shareholders 2 5 1 1 3 763
Number of subsidiaries 4 24 0 1 9 763
Turnover of firm's Global Ultimate Owner (Millions of USD) 23,400 53,500 151 5,948 57,500 243
Firm's Global Ultimate Owner's number of employees 46,248 71,927 446 15,211 106,931 230
Standard 
Deviation Obs.10th 50th 90th
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Table 5: Firm characteristics by ETS participation status
ETS Firms non ETS Firms
Variable Mean Mean
Age of company 120 391 426 81 299 324
Turnover (Millions of EUR) ** 730.62 3,562.64 405 146.67 769.22 294
Firm's number of employees ** 1,440 5,047 401 468 858 301
Earnings before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) (Millions of EUR) ** 25.17 103.80 397 5.20 23.50 288
Number of shareholders 2 5 435 2 5 328
Number of subsidiaries 6 31 435 2 5 328
Turnover of firm's Global Ultimate Owner (Millions of USD) 30,900 66,100 144 12,300 21,900 99
Firm's Global Ultimate Owner's number of employees 49,286 70,860 134 41,943 73,569 96
Std. Dev. Obs. Std. Dev. Obs.
Notes: Based on 2007 data. Stars next to a variable name indicate that the respective means for ETS and non-ETS firms
are significantly different at the 10 (*), 5 (**), and 1(***) percent level.
Finally, Table 6 shows the wide variation in basic firm characteristics obtained from the interviews
data. For example, while most firms report that they cannot pass on CO2 related costs to their cus-
tomers (row 23), there are some firms that report that they can pass on 100% of such a cost increase.
Together with table 7 it also summarize the responses to the scored interview questions described
above in the pooled sample of all countries. The various variables will be refered to and described
further in the subsequent sections of this report.
4.2 Differences between EU ETS firms and others
Tables 8 and 9 report the mean and standard deviations for the interview responses separately for EU
ETS firms and non EU ETS firms. Stars behind the variable names indicate that the means differ
between the two groups in a statistically significant manner. We observe significant differences in
a number of firm characteristics. For example, EU ETS firms report a higher expected impact of
any climate change legislation in the future (row 1 in the panel on impacts). Further, EU ETS firms
seem to perform better on a range of the “Measures” questions. This is consistent with the idea that
participation in the EU ETS induces firms to pursue more aggressive measures to reduce emissions
due to the price signal. However, we must be cautious with causal interpretations of the evidence in
Tables 6 and 7, not least because we do not control for confounding factors such as sectoral differences
between EU ETS and non EU ETS firms or the fact that EU ETS firms are typically larger.
Figure 1 illustrates how EU ETS and non EU ETS firms differ along various dimensions highlighted
in our survey. The graphs controls for sector fixed effects at the 3-digit level and noise controls
such as interviewer dummies. We can see that EU ETS firms are larger than non EU ETS firms and
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Table 6: Interview Summary Statistics (Part 1)
Percentiles
Variable Mean
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
Number of production sites (worldwide) 57.05 318.45 1 6 85 692
Number of production sites (EU) 19.12 108.66 1 4 30 641
Number of production sites (country) 5.77 21.80 1 2 10 748
Number of employees (worldwide) 19,666.49 49,807.61 100 1,750 55,000 653
Number of employees (country) 2,725.11 18,915.14 90 450 4,000 714
Number of employees (site) 598.73 1,451.80 64 240 1,200 751
M
an
ag
er Tenure in company (in years) 15.11 10.81 3 13 30 763
Tenure in current post (in years) 7.04 6.91 1 5 15 761
E
T
S
Number of sites covered by ETS 3.93 7.71 0 1 10 459
ETS Stringency Score 2.30 1.23 1 2 4 429
ETS Rationality Score 2.57 1.19 1 3 4 369
ETS Anticipation Score 3.23 1.00 2 3 4 365
Pr
ic
es
Expected change in energy prices by 2020 (in %) 70.22 76.31 15 50 150 463
Upper expected bound for energy price change in 2020 (in %) 93.53 134.44 10 50 300 140
Lower expected bound for energy price change in 2020 (in %) 52.43 64.73 10 30 110 145
Expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR 44.44 46.60 20 34 90 171
Maximum expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR 60.03 90.90 20 49 100 139
Minimum expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR 25.48 18.79 10 20 50 119
Im
pa
ct
Future Impact Score 1.87 1.29 1 1 4 729
Future Impact 80% Free Allowance Score 1.74 1.03 1 1 3 273
Future Impact Reliability Score 2.43 1.15 1 3 4 655
Cost Pass-Through (in %) 24.46 38.04 0 0 100 562
C
om
pe
tit
io
n
Number of competitors (worldwide) 95.72 891.90 3 10 100 556
Number of competitors (EU) 46.14 389.11 2 6 40 628
Number of competitors (country) 23.63 172.52 0 3 20 712
Non EU Competitors Share* 0.31 0.32 0 0 1 520
Share of total export sales (world) 45.33 33.63 2 45 95 669
Share of export sales to EU-member states 32.52 27.76 0 25 75 626
Customer Pressure Score 2.27 1.31 1 2 4 751
Standard 
Deviation
Valid 
Responses10th 50th 90th
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Table 7: Interview Summary Statistics (Part 2)
Percentiles
Variable Mean
In
no
va
tio
n Climate-Related Products Score 1.82 1.28 1 1 4 759
Climate-Related Product Innovations Score 1.84 1.24 1 1 4 757
Climate-Related Process Innovations Score 2.31 1.17 1 2 4 752
M
ea
su
re
s
Energy Monitoring Score 3.73 1.27 2 4 5 756
Energy Targets Score 2.58 1.27 1 3 4 744
Five year energy reduction target (in %) 19.47 14.68 5 16.1 40.95 387
GHG Monitoring Score 2.62 1.39 1 3 5 755
GHG Targets Score 1.38 0.91 1 1 3 599
Five year GHG reduction target (in %) 23.43 20.62 4 18.46 55.63 125
Target Enforcement Score 2.42 1.29 1 2 4 614
Variety sum of measures - measure creativity 3.36 2.09 1 3 6 763
Energy reduction through most significant measure (in %) 14.00 15.54 2 10 30 461
GHG reduction through most significant measure (in %) 16.72 19.69 2 10 50 333
Possible energy reduction at zero cost (in %) 6.61 10.58 0 4 17.5 587
23.26 24.34 1 15 50 553
In
ve
st
m
en
t
Required payback time for energy-saving investments (in years) 3.86 3.10 1.5 3 7 541
Payback Time Stringency Score 2.69 0.90 1 3 3 553
Standard 
Deviation
Valid 
Responses10th 50th 90th
Theoretically feasible energy reduction (in % of current energy 
consumption)
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Table 8: Interview Summary Statistics by ETS Status (Part 1)
ETS Firms non ETS Firms
Variable Mean Mean
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
Number of production sites (worldwide) 64.80 373.57 392 46.86 226.77 300
Number of production sites (EU)* 24.27 130.66 379 11.61 63.79 262
Number of production sites (country) 6.30 25.29 424 5.07 16.12 324
Number of employees (worldwide)** 25,941.51 54,506.59 375 11,119.88 41,162.35 278
Number of employees (country) 2,812.52 8,735.31 399 2,613.71 26,793.00 315
Number of employees (site)** 773.20 1,772.33 424 371.23 820.93 327
M
an
ag
er Tenure in company (in years) 15.93 10.38 435 14.03 11.29 328
Tenure in current post (in years)* 7.19 7.18 434 6.84 6.55 327
Pr
ic
es
Expected change in energy prices by 2020 (in %) 76.77 75.03 261 61.71 77.31 202
113.07 126.54 81 66.50 141.29 59
64.28 72.14 84 35.72 48.36 61
Expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR** 42.79 47.59 144 53.24 40.57 27
Maximum expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR 58.98 91.38 125 69.50 89.20 14
Minimum expected price per ton of CO2 in 2020 in EUR 24.73 18.00 109 33.80 25.66 10
Im
pa
ct
Future Impact Score*** 2.14 1.44 422 1.49 0.91 307
Future Impact 80% Free Allowance Score 1.84 1.11 185 1.53 0.81 88
Future Impact Reliability Score*** 2.60 1.18 403 2.16 1.06 252
Cost Pass-Through (in %) 23.83 37.09 325 25.33 39.38 237
C
om
pe
tit
io
n
Number of competitors (worldwide) 63.64 352.00 320 139.70 1,310.54 236
Number of competitors (EU)** 24.29 117.66 366 77.05 587.49 262
Number of competitors (country)** 13.28 111.68 403 37.24 228.66 309
Non EU Competitors Share* 0.33 0.32 299 0.29 0.31 221
Share of total export sales (world) 47.92 32.15 373 42.07 35.20 296
Share of export sales to EU-member states 35.03 26.91 357 29.19 28.56 269
Customer Pressure Score 2.28 1.32 423 2.26 1.29 328
Strd. Dev.
Valid 
Resp. Strd. Dev.
Valid 
Resp.
Upper expected bound for energy price change in 2020 (in 
%)
Lower expected bound for energy price change in 2020 (in 
%)
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Table 9: Interview Summary Statistics by ETS Status (Part 2)
ETS Firms non ETS Firms
Variable Mean Mean
In
no
va
tio
n Climate-Related Products Score 1.84 1.27 432 1.81 1.29 327
Climate-Related Product Innovations Score 1.87 1.25 429 1.80 1.22 328
Climate-Related Process Innovations Score*** 2.50 1.20 429 2.07 1.09 323
M
ea
su
re
s
Energy Monitoring Score*** 4.20 0.98 432 3.09 1.33 324
Energy Targets Score*** 2.82 1.21 428 2.25 1.27 316
Five year energy reduction target (in %)** 17.87 13.12 247 22.33 16.79 140
GHG Monitoring Score*** 3.21 1.20 432 1.83 1.23 323
GHG Targets Score*** 1.58 1.08 354 1.11 0.49 245
Five year GHG reduction target (in %) 22.06 20.55 86 26.59 20.70 39
Target Enforcement Score*** 2.66 1.37 372 2.05 1.07 242
Variety sum of measures - measure creativity 3.43 1.97 435 3.28 2.23 328
Energy reduction through most significant measure (in %) 13.91 16.18 283 14.16 14.49 178
GHG reduction through most significant measure (in %) 17.04 19.83 232 15.96 19.44 101
Possible energy reduction at zero cost (in %) 6.12 10.81 352 7.33 10.22 235
23.26 25.29 333 23.27 22.87 220
In
ve
st
m
en
t
3.86 3.37 325 3.86 2.65 216
Payback Time Stringency Score 2.69 0.89 333 2.70 0.90 220
Std. Dev.
Valid 
Resp. Std. Dev.
Valid 
Resp.
Theoretically feasible energy reduction (in % of current 
energy consumption)
Required payback time for energy-saving investments (in 
years)
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systematically differ with respect to a variety of management practices relating to climate and energy
matters. The figure
confirms the result in Table 8 that EU ETS firms report more pessimistically on the impact that climate
change policies will have in the future (see Section 6 below for further analysis). Interestingly, EU
ETS firms are expecting significantly lower CO2 prices than non EU ETS firms. This finding is
discussed further in section 4.3.2 below. Even after controlling for size and industry, EU ETS firms
appear more exposed to the global market with higher export shares and higher fractions of non-EU
competitors.
4.3 Attitudes and expectations relevant for climate policy
The way a firm copes with a long-run problem such as climate change will depend on its expectations
about future policies. This sub section presents a number of stylized facts pertinent to these issues,
which emerge from our interviews. In so doing, we mainly rely on comparisons of firms across
countries and sectors.
4.3.1 Investment criteria and the “energy efficiency paradox”
Investment decisions are very relevant for the success of climate policies as they determine the energy
and carbon intensities of the capital stock for many years. It is common among managers to decide
on investment opportunities using a “payback time criterion”, i.e. the number of years it takes the
investor to recoup the cost of the investment paid upfront. Respondents were asked which payback
criterion they applied in the economic evaluation of an energy efficiency enhancing measure that they
considered but eventually failed to adopt (cf. question 24b in appendix B). On average, respondents
required a payback within 3 years and 10 months, and there was no difference between firms in the EU
ETS and those outside (cf. tables on page 22 and on the previous page). To put this into perspective,
consider a project with a one-time investment cost, incurred at the beginning of the project’s 15-year
lifetime, and annual payoffs thereafter. For the investment cost to be recouped within less than 4
years, the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project must be 25% or higher. From the point-of-view
of neoclassical investment theory, this IRR appears surprisingly high, especially since many energy
efficiency upgrades are well-known technologies that do not command a high risk premium on top
of the market rate. The rather short payback criteria we find is reminiscient of the “energy efficiency
paradox”, a term coined for the observation that firms routinely reject seemingly profitable investment
opportunities in energy efficiency (see e.g. DeCanio, 1993).
The implication of firms foregoing energy-saving investments in spite of a positive net present value
is that the incremental cost of reducing their energy consumption is zero or negative. This is con-
firmed in the data in that repondents reported that they could reduce their GHG emissions or energy
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Figure 1: Responses of ETS firms and non-ETS firms
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expect a carbon price that is approximately half a standard deviation lower than firms that are not in the ETS.
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Figure 2: Payback time for energy efficiency projects
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Notes: The bars represent the payback criterion (in years) for energy efficiency investments, averaged over firms in a
given country (a) and 3-digit industry (b). Confidence bands are calculated at the 95% level.
consumption by 6.6% at zero cost (out of a technically feasible 23.3% on average). These findings
speak to the presence of an energy efficiency paradox in our data and confirm results previously found
for UK manufacturing firms (Martin et al., 2010).
Next, we investigate how these patterns vary across countries and sectors. Figure 2a shows the average
payback criterion by country. Payback criteria in France and especially in the UK are more stringent
than the mean whereas Germany and Poland allow longer payback times of more than 4 or 5 years,
respectively. Sampling error aside, these observations can have several explanations. For instance,
a neoclassical economist might argue that energy efficiency projects command different risk premia
due to cross-country differences in industrial structure, energy prices and government policies. A
behavioural economist might want to add that an investor’s attitude towards such investments is influ-
enced by past experiences, cultural background, and by the organizational structure of the firm. The
role of industrial structure is clarified by Figure 2b which displays how the payback criterion varies
across 3-digit industries. Most industries allow 4 years for payback. Others require faster payback,
like the textiles/leather, ceramics, other minerals and other basic metals sectors. In a comparison of
criteria of the iron & steel vs. other basic metals industries, the 95% confidence intervals do not over-
lap. This begs the question of what is driving such differences in payback criteria. For example, it
could be the case that energy efficiency investments are more material in some industries (e.g. those
with high energy cost shares) than in others and hence longer payback times are tolerated.
In a related question (24c of the questionnaire) we asked whether payback criteria for investments in
energy efficiency are more or less stringent than those applied to other investment projects. The scores
given for this question average at 2.69 for both ETS and non-ETS firms, which is just below a score 3
corresponding to “no difference”. The fact that the average score is below 3 points to a weak and not
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Figure 3: Payback time stringency score
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Notes: The bars represent the payback stringency score, averaged over firms in a given country (a) and 3-digit sector (b).
A score lower than 3 indicates that payback times are longer for energy efficiency project than for others, and vice versa.
Confidence bands are calculated at the 95% level.
statistically significant tendency towards longer payback times for energy efficiency investments. This
tendency could be driven by a lower-than-average risk of energy efficiency improvements. However,
Figure 3 shows that there are difference across countries and sectors. For example, Figure 3a shows
that firms in Belgium, France, the UK and Germany use significantly less stringent payback criteria
in the evaluation of energy efficiency projects than for other projects. At a score of 2.5, German firms
apply the least stringent criteria whereas Hungarian and Polish firms apply criteria above the average.
The sectoral picture in Figure 3b shows no significant deviations from the mean stringency. This
suggests that behavioural difference are more likely to be driven by cross-country differences such as
prices, policies and culture than by differences in the industrial composition.
4.3.2 Expectations about prices and policies
The Kyoto Protocol and phase II of the EU ETS both stipulate binding abatement commitments for
the period from 2008 until 2012. Given that the planning horizon for investment projects usually
exceeds 5 years, the measures firms take today in order to reduce their energy consumption and GHG
emissions depend only in part on current regulation but to a large extent on their expectations about
prices for energy and carbon beyond 2012. We asked the respondents about their expecations about
energy price changes and about the level of CO2 prices by 2020.
The average firm expects energy prices to grow by 70.2% until 2020. This expectation is somewhat
higher in ETS than in non-ETS firms, but the difference is not statistically significant. Among the
firms that gave bounds7 for the expected energy price increase, the average upper bound corresponds
to an almost doubling of energy prices by 2020 (93.5%). The lower bound averages at 52.4%. The
spread in expecations is about 20 percentage points larger in ETS firms than in non-ETS firms.
Figure 4a displays the cross-country variation in the expected growth in energy prices. The expected
7While we did not explicitly ask for upper and lower bounds on energy and carbon prices, we recorded them whenever
respondents mentioned them to us.
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Figure 4: Expected energy price
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Notes: The bars represent the expected energy price increase in percent, averaged over firms in a given country (a) and
3-digit sector (b). Confidence bands are calculated at the 95% level.
Figure 5: Expected carbon price in 2020
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Notes: The bars represent the expected CO2 price in Euros per tons, averaged over firms in a given country (a) and 3-digit
sector (b). Confidence bands are calculated at the 95% level.
price increase is lowest in France (perhaps because of the large share of nuclear energy in that country)
and highest in Belgium (the 95% confidence intervals do not overlap). German firms expect the
second-lowest price increases and Hungarian firms expect the second-highest. Furthermore, there is
some heterogeneity in expectations across 3-digit industries (as depicted in Figure 4b). While the
cement and the chemicals and plastics industries expect the largest price increases, expectations are
lowest in the Publishing and Other Minerals sectors. However, the confidence bands are large and
overlap.
Turning to CO2 prices, the average expectation is at C44.4 per ton in 2020. ETS firms expect a lower
carbon price of C42.7 than non-ETS firms (C54.2), and the difference is statistically significant at
the 5% level. This heterogeneity in expectations is intriguing as it suggests that current exposure to
the ETS shapes the firm’s expecations about future climate policy and hence about carbon prices. An
explanation for this could be the fact that many countries set rather generous caps for the ETS sector
which resulted in relatively low permit prices (Klepper and Peterson, 2006). Firms outside the ETS
may rationally anticipate that regulation for the non-ETS sectors must be more stringent in order to
comply with the EU target of 20% emission reductions by 2020, and hence expect marginal abatement
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Figure 6: Bounds on the energy price change
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Notes: The bars represent the expected energy price increase (in percent) by 2020, averaged over firms in a given country
(a) and 3-digit sector (b). The bands represent the average difference between the reported upper and lower bounds on the
price change.
Figure 7: Bounds on CO2 prices
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Notes: The bars represent the expected CO2 price in 2020, averaged over firms in a given country (a) and 3-digit sector
(b). The bands represent the average difference between the reported upper and lower bounds on the carbon price.
costs to be higher. In addition, the expected carbon price should be higher if policies implemented in
the non-ETS sector fail to be cost effective. An alternative explanation is that non-ETS firms simply
over-estimate their marginal abatement costs for a lack of experience. Further research is needed to
distinguish between these hypotheses. In the following sections we will see more evidence of this
type of heterogeneity.
According to the theory of real options (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the level of investment into energy
and carbon saving technologies should not only depend on the expectations about future energy and
carbon prices but also on the uncertainty that investors face with regard to these prices. Figure 6 shows
these bounds by country and industry along with the mean expectation across firms that reported
bounds. The main variation in bounds is across countries, with Belgian and Polish firms exhibiting
the largest uncertainty about the future energy price increase. Expectations are quite homogeneous
across industries with the exception of the textile and fuels industries, which exhibit larger mean and
spread expectations respectively.
Figure 7 displays the bounds on the expected carbon price by country and industry. Uncertainty about
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Figure 8: Future impact of carbon pricing
(a) by country (b) by sector
Notes: The bars show the average the average score in a given country (a) or 3-digit sector (b). Confidence bands are
calculated at the 95% level.
CO2 prices is largest in Germany, followed by France, Poland and Belgium. UK firms appear to
have the most certain expectations of the carbon price in 2020. This may be related to the fact that
this country, unlike other EU member states, has adopted legally binding targets for GHG abatement
under national law (the UK Climate Bill). Expectations across sectors mostly vary between 20 and
50 Euros per ton, with large upward outliers in the wood and paper industry, chemicals and plastics
as well as in the other minerals industries.
While expected carbon prices have the advantage of being easily comparable across firms, they do
not convey any information about how firms are going to be affected by them. Clearly, a given level
of the carbon price may have different consequences for different firms and sectors. This is why we
also collected a more direct measure of the expected impact of future climate policies on outsourcing
and relocation decisions (question 12 in appendix B). The mean score is 1.87 (on a scale from 1
to 5) but ETS firms expect a significantly higher impact of 2.14 than non-ETS firms (1.49). Along
with the above-mentioned finding that ETS firms expect lower carbon prices, this demonstrates that
carbon prices have heterogenous impacts and thus cannot serve as an impact measure themselves.
For example, it could be that ETS firms are likely to be more carbon intensive and would therefore
be more sensitive to climate policy, even at a lower carbon price. Moreover, ETS firms were judged
significantly more reliable in answering this question (though at a low level).
Figure 8a displays cross-country differences in the future impact score. We find that German and
French firms expect significantly stronger impacts of future climate policies than Hungary. However,
there is less than a 5% chance that firms outsource more than 10% of their production levels in
response to regulation. Figure 8b shows the impact across industries. Most affected are fuels and
other minerals, glass, iron and steel industries. For all other industries the expected future impact
is rather low. In neither case do we find that plant closure and complete relocation is in the 95%
confidence interval. Figure 9 provides a more detailed picture of the distribution of the answers to
these questions, by country and industry.
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Figure 9: Future impact of climate policy
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Figure 10a displays the deviation from the mean expected stringency by country after controlling
for interviewer noise (left) and industry (right). After controlling for industrial composition, we
find that only French firms expect significantly stronger-than-average impacts.8 The main source of
heterogeneity in the future impact questions answers are thus the sectoral differences shown in Figure
10b.
4.3.3 Country-level ranking of climate-friendliness
In order to compare the overall performance of countries in our sample we construct a “climate-
friendliness” index for each firm by averaging over five components, namely (1) the average of energy
and GHG monitoring and targeting scores (see Table 7); (2) the average of climate-related product
and process innovation scores (see Table 7); (3) the score of having a lower payback time for climate
investments than for others (described in Figure 3) multiplied by minus one; (4) the number of mit-
igation measures adopted; and (5) for EU ETS firms, the score of how rational they behave on the
market (see Figure 15 below). Before averaging, we remove interviewer noise and control for the
sector of the firm and then normalise all scores.
The climate-friendliness index varies widely across firms. Table 10 and Figure 11 reports the average
index bycountry. It appears that France has the highest average normalised index score followed
by Belgium. The country performing worst on this metric is Poland. Upon taking a closer look
at the density function of the index plotted in Figure 12, we find that this ranking can vary along
8This could be driven in part by the announcement close to the time of our survey by French president Nicolas Sarkozy
to impose a carbon tax on the non-ETS sector of the French economy .
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Figure 10: Differences in future impact of climate change policy score
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Notes: Figure a is based on a regression of the score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise (left)
and sector (right). The bars indicate the deviation of a country’s intercept from the mean of country intercepts. Figure b is
based on a regression of the score on industry dummies with additional controls for interview noise (left) and employment
size (right). The bars indicate the deviation of an industry’s intercept from the mean of industry intercepts.
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Table 10: Climate-friendliness index
country
climate friendliness index
mean median
Belgium 0.004 0.000 0.484
France 0.104 0.083 0.557
Germany -0.013 -0.070 0.544
Hungary -0.059 -0.169 0.454
Poland -0.249 -0.282 0.500
UK -0.025 -0.064 0.564
standard 
deviation
Notes: The Climate-friendliness index is constructed by averaging (1) the average of energy and GHG monitoring and
targeting scores; (2) the average of normalised climate-related product and process innovation scores ; (3) the normalised
score of having a lower payback time for climate investments than for others multiplied by minus one; (4) the normalised
number of mitigation measures adopted; and (5) for EU ETS firms, the normalised score of how rational they behave on
the market. Each of these scores is computed as the normalised residual of a regression of the raw score on interviewer
and sector dummies.
the distribution across firms. Polish firms in our sample perform worse (in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance) than UK firms. French firms appear to be more “climate friendly” across the
distribution, except for the very best of UK firms that outperform all other firms in our sample. The
average score index for UK firms is thus pulled down by a number of laggards. The distribution of
Hungarian firms is skewed towards the left, but the top firms perform as well as those in non-Eastern
Europe countries. In all countries, these results show the potential for large improvements if the
laggards were to adopt the practices of those at the median.
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Figure 11: Average climate friendliness index
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Notes: Based on a regression of the score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise and sector.
The bars indicate the deviation of a country’s intercept from the mean of country intercepts. The stars represent the
significance of the coefficent on each country’s dummy.
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Figure 12: Climate-friendliness index density
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5 The behaviour of firms in the EU ETS
This section sheds light on the behaviour of EU ETS firm on the permit market. We first analyse the
perceived stringency of current and future ETS targets and their relationship to other firm characteris-
tics. We then relate these findings to the way firms manage compliance with their allocated emissions
by trading on the allowance market.
5.1 Stringency of EU ETS targets
The stringency of the EU ETS depends on many aspects such as the initial allocation, the marginal
abatement cost curve, the level and volatility of the permit price, the share of abatement and trading
costs in total costs, and so on. Although the “independence principle” maintains that the initial per-
mit allocation does not affect the efficiency of the trading system, academic economists have been
advocating the use of auctions for distributing permits (Montgomery, 1972). In contrast, under the
EU ETS grandfathering has been the dominant method of permit distribution thus far, and it is likely
that this has given rise to very heterogeneous experiences for firms, ranging from windfall profits at
overallocated firms to high compliance cost at underallocated firms. According to Brewer (2005) and
McKinsey and Ecofys (2005) there was much uncertainty in the business community surrounding
the implementation of the EU ETS, its functionality and also its credibility as a tool for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Both these studies support the view that EU ETS participants’ “market
rationality” was likely hindered by the confusion over the design of current policy and stringency of
future policy.
During our interviews, managers were scored based on their (open ended) assessment of how stringent
the EU ETS has been for their firm. The median score of 2 and an average score of 2.29 presented
in Figure 13a suggest that on average manufacturing firms have not had their businesses disrupted
and are able to comply with relative ease. There are however around 50% of firms for which some
adjustment was required.
In panel b of Figure 13 we plot the deviation of the country intercepts from the mean intercept for
the EU ETS stringency score, both with and without sector controls. Panel b displays the deviation
of the industry intercepts from the mean intercepts with and without firm size controls. All else being
equal, German and Polish firms perceive the EU ETS as more stringent than the average firm whereas
French and Hungarian firms feel less under pressure. Furthermore, targets appear less stringent than
average to firms in the chemical and plastics industries and to those producing basic metals.
Figure 14 displays the distribution of expectations about the stringency of phase III of the ETS after
2012. The median stringency score has increased to 3 compared to 2 for the current phase. Moreover,
the fraction of firms answering that the cap they receive will allow them to continue doing business
as usual declined from almost 40% (for the current stringency) to less than 10%. Nevertheless, most
firms expect that only some minor adjustments would be needed to meet their cap even in phase III.
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Figure 13: Differences in stringency of EU ETS score
(a) general
UK(57)
UK(57)
Poland(52)
Poland(52)
Hungary(32)
Hungary(32)
Germ ny(93)**
Germany(93)**
France 87 **
France(87)**
B gium(8 )
Belgium(82)
-.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
N ise Controls
Noise Controls
UK(57)
Poland(52)
Hungary(32)
Germany(93)**
France(87)*
Belgium(82)
-.5 0 .5 1
S ctor a d Noise Controls
Sector and Noise Controls
(b) by country
Wood&Paper(72)
Wood&Paper(72)
Vehicles(21)
Vehicles(21)
T xtile/Leather(8)
Textile/Leather(8)
VCommunication(3)
TVCommunication(3)
Publishing(4 *
Publishing(4)*
Ot erMi rals(7)
OtherMinerals(7)
BasicMetals(7)**
OtherBasicMetals(7)**
Machinery&Op cs(9)*
Machinery&Optics(9)*
Iron&Ste l(29)
Iron&Steel(29)
Gl ss(30)
Glass(30)
F rnitur / ec 1 *
Furniture/nec(1)*
e 14
Fuels(14)
od/Tob c o(69)
Food/Tobacco(69)
a r cated ll 6
FabricatedMetalls(6)
Ch mic l&Plas (6 *
Chemical&Plastic(63)**
amic (8)
Ceramics(8)
me (52
Cement(52)
-1
-1
0
0
1
1
2
2
N i  C ntrol
Noise Controls
Wood&Paper(72)
Vehicles(21)
Textile/Leather(8)
TVCommunication(3)
Publishing(4)*
OtherMinerals(7)
OtherBasicMetals(7)**
Machinery&Optics(9)*
Iron&Steel(29)
Glass(30)
Furniture/nec(1)*
Fuels(14)
Food/Tobacco(69)
FabricatedMetalls(6)
Chemical&Plastic(63)**
Ceramics(8)
Cement(52)
-1 0 1 2
Size a d Noi  Controls
Size and Noise Controls
(c) by industry
Notes: Figure a presents the results to the question refering to the stringency of the EU ETS at present for the interviewed
firms. Figure b is based on a regression of the score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise (left)
and sector (right). The bars indicate the deviation of a country’s intercept from the mean of country intercepts. Figure c is
based on a regression of the score on industry dummies with additional controls for interview noise (left) and employment
size (right). The bars indicate the deviation of an industry’s intercept from the mean of industry intercepts.
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Figure 14: Anticipation of ETS stringency in phase III
5.2 Rationality of trading on the allowance market
Several interview questions focus on the way manufacturing firms act on the allowance market. The
score measuring the rationality of firms’ trading behaviour averages at 2.57 (out of 5) and has a
median of 3, as shown in Table 6 and in Figure 15a. This means that the average firm does not
routinely use permit trading as a tool to reduce compliance cost or to generate extra revenues from
excess abatement. About 30% of firms participate only passively in the ETS, meaning that they
do not consider carbon permits as a financial asset that provides an opportunity to make a profit.
These firms take their permit allocation as a target to be met, much in the spirit of “command-and-
control” regulation. This is a problem because it prevents firms from minimizing their abatement cost
which, on theoretical grounds, makes permit trading superior to command-and-control regulation.
For example, the total compliance cost of a given emission cap will not be minimized unless firms
rationally choose abatement levels such that their marginal abatement cost equals the permit price.
While there are significant differences in ETS engagement between sectors, any differences between
countries are not statistically significant, as shown in Figure 15c. In contrast, Figure 15d shows that
some industries (i.e. cement, chemicals and plastics, fuels) are seizing permit market opportunities
more efficiently than others.
A similar pattern arises when looking at the frequency of allowance trading across firms. Figures 16
and 17 show that the majority of ETS participants do not trade on the ETS market. Firms trade permits
at least on a quarterly basis in five of the six sample countries across a variety of industries.9 While
some firms do not need to trade because their emissions exactly match their allocated allowances,
other firms may have excess allowances that they do not supply to the market. Some policy makers
are concerned that this behaviour exacerbates the shortage of allowances and hence drives up the
allowance price. Failure to sell excess allowances can have different reasons. For example, firms
might want to bank permits in order to hedge against future carbon price increases. It could also
9Anecdotal evidence suggests that Polish firms failed to trade more frequently due to institutional barriers and delays,
not because of a lack of aptitude or willingness to engage in the market. For instance, Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008)
note that “Poland must be counted as figuring centrally among the ETS implementation laggards so far. It was seriously
delayed in NAP I” (p. 281).
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Figure 15: Rationality of EU ETS participation score
(a) general
(b) by country (c) by industry
Notes: Figure a shows a histogram of the interview score measuring whether the firm is acting rationally on the EU ETS
market. Figure b is based on a regression of the score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise
(left) and sector (right). The bars indicate the deviation of a country’s intercept from the mean of country intercepts.
Figure c is based on a regression of the score on industry dummies with additional controls for interview noise (left) and
employment size (right). The bars indicate the deviation of an industry’s intercept from the mean of industry intercepts.
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Figure 16: EU ETS market participation
Figure 17: Frequency of permit trading
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be the case that firms face high transaction and information costs related to trading or that they fail
to optimise. Murphy and Stranlund (2007) suggest that an “endowment effect” – the overvaluation
of items in one’s possession – could prevent firms from selling permits they were allocated for free.
A “status quo bias” (Kahneman et al., 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) can have similar
consequences.
We test for the presence of an endowment effect by running probit regressions on the binary event
“Selling on the EU ETS market” derived from question 7 of the interview (see Appendix B). The
main explanatory variables are a set of dummy variables calculated on the basis of the distribution of
excess allowance allocations in 2008 given by
Excessi,2008 = Alloi,2008−CO2i,2008
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Table 11: Firms’ trading decisions on the EU ETS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Buys or Sells in ETS Sells in ETS
0.032* 0.024 -0.008 -0.030 -0.035
lnCO2 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
EU ETS Rationality Score 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.060**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
0-1685 0.162 0.174
(0.115) (0.117)
1685-4844 0.147 0.130
(0.117) (0.118)
4844-10661 0.411*** 0.406***
(0.094) (0.096)
10661-27323 0.547*** 0.528***
(0.079) (0.082)
>27323 0.491*** 0.490***
(0.093) (0.094)
Observations 286 286 286286 286 286
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where Alloi,2008 and CO2i,2008 are taken from the CITL and denote the allowance allocation and actual
emissions of firm i in 2008, respectively. We split firms with positive excess permits into five groups,
each containing the same number of firms. The five groups are defined by the quintiles of the distri-
bution of Excessi,2008 (1,701; 5,387; 11,722; 32,100 allowances). Let each group be represented by
a dummy variable Qq,i, where the subscript q indicates the quintile, so that we can express the latent
equation underlying the probit as
Propensity to selli =∑
q
βqQq,i+βxXi+ εi (1)
and Xi is vector of additional control variables. Table 11 reports the results from estimating various
versions of equation (1). The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the binary event “Trading in
the ETS”, defined as buying or selling. Column 1 shows that trading is weakly correlated with the
total amount of CO2 emitted by the firm. Column 2 shows that it is more strongly correlated with
the rationality score we derived from our interviews, which underlines the internal consistency of
this score. In columns 3 to 5, we examine the decision to sell allowances on the EU ETS market.
Columns 4 and 5 show that firms with excess allowance amounts in the 3rd quintile and higher have a
heightened probability of selling allowances on the EU ETS market. Since the table reports marginal
effects, the coefficient estimates imply that a firm with more than 4,844 allowances to spare is at least
41% more likely to sell some or all of those allowances on the EU ETS market than a firm that is not
over-allocated. This implies that allowances are less likely to be traded when the revenue derived by
their owners is small, a finding that could be rationalized by a fixed cost of trading.
How important is this issue on aggregate? To answer this question, we examine what share of the ex-
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Figure 18: Firms’ propensity to sell by quintile of the excess distribution
(a) Marginal effects
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(b) Distribution of excess permits
Notes: Figure a presents the coefficients of the probit regression of column (3) in Table , each bar representing the
probability of a firm with excess permits within that range to sell permits on the EU ETS market. Figure b displays the
proportion of excess permits held by firms in each quintile of the excess permit distribution.
cess allowances is held by firms in quintiles 1 and 2. Figure 18 illustrates this share in the distribution
of excess allowances. We see that failure to sell excess allowances is of minor importance since far
less than 10% of excess allowances fall into no trade categories given by the first two quintiles.
6 Vulnerability of sectors and firms to carbon leakage
6.1 The vulnerability of a sector to carbon leakage
In phases I and II of the EU ETS, tradable permits were handed out for free to existing business
sites based on their historical emissions, on growth projections and on the Kyoto obligations of the
countries they were located in. In contrast, the European Commission is committed to drastically
increasing the share of permits that will be auctioned in phase III. This implies that the ownership of
emissions will be transferred from incumbent polluters back to governments and, ultimately, taxpay-
ers. Not surprisingly, it has proven difficult to defend this objective against the powerful interests of
the affected firms and industries. In trying to lobby the EU law makers into exempting their indus-
try from permit auctioning, these interest groups are able to exploit two genuine concerns for policy
makers, carbon leakage and job losses.
In April 2009 the EU Parliament released Directive 2009/29/EC10 following a proposal by the Eu-
ropean Commission. The directive specifies the rules for determining which sectors11 will be at
significant risk of carbon leakage if the practice of free allocation of permits is given up in favour of
auctions. In essence, the Commission proposes two criteria for establishing the risk of carbon leakage
10See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF
11Sectors are examined at the NACE 4-digit level where possible, with some at the NACE 3-digit level. NACE stands for
"Nomenclature Generale des Activites Economiques dans I‘Union Europeenne" (General Name for Economic Activities
in the European Union).
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and thus for determining the recipients of free permits: total CO2 costs (both direct and indirect)12
relative to the value added of a sector, referred to as “Value at Stake” (VaS)13 hereafter, and the trade
intensity of a sector (TI).14 The construction of these metrics by the Commission are discussed in
Section 6.2 below. Both metrics relate to factors that determine the business response to an increase
in carbon prices and associated allocations of emission permits. One can distinguish between three
such factors, namely (i) cost impact, (ii) demand response and (iii) factor specificity.
The cost impact of carbon pricing is proportional to a firm or sector’s use of non-renewable energy.
In the past this cost was not fully imposed on the firm or sector, as it received a large allocation of
permits for free. With auctioning it will be exposed to the full costs of EUAs and the VaS metric is
designed principally to capture this cost impact.
The demand response determines a firm’s ability to pass on the cost impact to its consumers in the
form of higher prices. For example, if the product the firm offers is highly traded between the EU and
other countries it will be difficult for the firm to pass through the permit cost as consumers can easily
switch to relatively cheaper products from non-EU competitors. The TI metric proxies for the degree
to which foreign competition prevents pass-through of the cost impact.
Factor specificity denotes the extent to which a firm or sector uses production factors that are specific
to EU countries. Examples include specific skills of the labour force, the presence of natural resource
deposits, and benefits associated with industrial agglomeration. Clearly, a firm using such country
specific factors more heavily is less likely to relocate in response to full auctioning than a firm that
can easily set up shop elsewhere.
A shortcoming of the TI measure is that it potentially reflects the effects of factor specificity in the
wrong way. To see this, notice that a high degree of factor specificity of a sector is likely to be
positively correlated with its trade intensity. This is because a country is more likely to export goods
that can only be produced in that country as it has an absolute advantage in their production (e.g. Swiss
watches). In spite of being able to pass through the full cost of permit auctioning, this sector will look
vulnerable according to the definition of trade intensity the Commission has suggested. In a similar
vein, even firms operating in highly traded industries may have substantial scope to pass costs on to
consumers if the product they sell is sufficiently differentiated from that of foreign rivals. Finally,
VaS misses an important aspect of the cost impact as it depends not only on the energy intensity of
a sector, but also on how easy it is to replace carbon intensive inputs by less carbon intensive ones.
In sum, while there are good arguments both in favour of and against using the measures employed
by the Commission, there is little direct empirical evidence that links them with the vulnerability of a
sector to climate change policies.
12Direct costs are the costs of total emissions, and indirect costs are electricity consumption multiplied by 0.465,
the average emissions intensity of electric power for the EU27. Prices of EUAs are assumed to be 30 C/tCO2 for all
calculations.
13The term Value at Stake is borrowed from previous work by Sato et al. ( 2007).
14Trade intensity is defined as “the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports
from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries”,
European Commission (2009), p. 24.
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6.2 The EU Commission’s definitions and data
Despite the best intentions of European lawmakers to implement full permit auctioning in phase III of
the EU ETS, there will still be a significant amount of European Union Emissions Allowances (EUAs)
allocated freely according to Community-wide harmonised rules for free allocation.15 Specifically,
the amended Directive 2003/87/EC16 (implementing the EU ETS legislation) explicitly allows ex-
emptions from EUA auctioning to prevent carbon leakage. This raises the question of which sectors
or subsectors are deemed to be at significant risk of carbon leakage and should therefore receive free
allocations of EUAs.17 18
The Commission has adopted two metrics to identify such sectors or subsectors: the sum of direct
and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of auctioning, which we refer to as Value
at Stake (VaS), and TI, the trade intensity of the sector or subsector. The direct costs are calculated as
the value of direct CO2 emissions (using a proxy price of 30C/tCO2), and the indirect costs capture
the exposure to electricity price rises that are inevitable on account of the full auctioning in the power
generation sector. Indirect costs are calculated as electricity consumption (in MWh) multiplied by the
European average emission intensity for electricity (0.465 tCO2/MWh), and applying the same proxy
EUA price (30C/tCO2). The ratio between the sum of the direct and indirect costs and the gross value
added of a sector is used as the metric gauging the sector’s vulnerability to carbon leakage due to the
cost burden full auctioning might impose. Trade intensity for each sector is calculated by dividing
the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries by the total
market size for the Community, with market size defined as annual turnover plus total imports from
third countries. These figures are available at the 4 digit sectoral level from the EU Commissions
Impact Assessment Report.19 Following the methodology suggested by the Commission for the TI
measure we also compute sectoral import and export intensity figures.
Note that the VaS and TI measures used by the Commission are very similar to those used by Sato
et al. (2007) to evaluate the impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness, and in some cases survival, of
a subset of UK industries thought to be at risk of significant job losses and carbon leakage. While their
study considers trade intensities of the given sectors by looking at both UK-intra EU and UK-extra
EU trade flows, the Commission (and our study) treat the EU as a block and focus on trade between
the EU and the rest of the world.
15The fact that these rules are to be harmonised at the EU level is already a major step in the right direction, as allocation
plans were designed in the past at the Member State level and submitted to the Commission for acceptance.
16http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0087:20090625:EN:PDF
17Another question relates to what should be the basis of the harmonised rules for allocating EUAs. Article 10a of
Directive 2003/87/EC specifies that ex-ante benchmarks calculated for products rather than for inputs shall be used so that
incentives to reduce emissions and maximize energy efficiency savings remain aligned with the over-arching missions of
the EU ETS to drive the transformation of the EU economy towards a low-carbon future.
18It is worth noting that the electricity generation sector – the largest sectors in the EU ETS by magnitude of emissions
– is not eligible for free allocation and will have to purchase EUAs by auction.
19http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/proportionate_ia_%20leakage_list16sep.pdf
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6.3 Vulnerability analysis
The Commission uses a combination of thresholds for VaS and TI to determine if a sector is at risk of
carbon leakage and hence are eligible for free permit allocation. Sectors are considered at significant
risk of carbon leakage if their VaS is greater than 5% and their TI is greater than 10%, or either VaS
or TI is greater than 30%. For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we subdivide eligible sectors
accordingly into three disjoint groups
A very high carbon intensity: VaS>30%
B high trade intensity and low to moderately high carbon intensity: VaS≤30% & TI>30%
C moderately high carbon and trade intensity: 5%<VaS≤30% & 10%<TI≤30%
Figure 19 illustrates the definition of these groups by plotting the location of 3-digit sectors in a
diagram with VaS on the vertical and TI on the horizontal axis. This shows that a large number of
sectors are in group B, receiving an exemption only on the basis of having a trade intensity higher
than 30%. In panel a of Figure 20 we examine the relative size of the exemption groups in more detail
by plotting the relative shares in terms of the number of firms, employment and CO2 emissions. In all
cases group B turns out to be the largest group with a share of at least 30%.
We are using two alternative measures for CO2 emissions, derived either from the EU ETS registry
known as the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) or from on the basis of the figures
reported in the EU Commission’ EU ETS Impact Assessment (IA)20. A key difference between the
two measures concerns the share of CO2 emissions that is not exempt from auctioning. Our figure
based on the CITL would suggest that this share is 12% whereas the CO2 figures from the IA suggest
a share of about 40%. It is likely that the true value lies somewhere in between these figures. The IA
figures include both emissions from sectors and firms that are regulated by the EU ETS and those that
are not. As inclusion in EU ETS depends on the energy capacity of an installation, non-regulated sec-
tors are likely to fall into the non-exempt category and therefore overestimate that group’s emissions
share.21 On the other hand, our CO2 measure based on the CITL is likely to be underestimating the
non-exempt group. This is because in order to assign firms in the CITL to exemption groups we first
have to identify the 4-digit NACE industrial sector they belong to as this information is not part of
the current version of the CITL. For that purpose we match the CITL data with firm level information
from the Bureau van Dijk ORBIS database.22 Depending on the country this has to be done using
string matching which implies that not all firms in the CITL will necessarily be matched.23 It is likely
that for larger firms the match is better, which would imply that a matched firm is more likely to be
20see Footnote 19
21Installations with a capacity of more than 20MW are regulated under the EU ETS.
22The EU Commission uses a similar approach when computing their figures in the Impact Assessment. They aug-
ment the CITL figures with other information on sectoral CO2 emissions, thereby including emissions from sources not
regulated under the EU ETS.
23Moreover, at this point we have created a mapping from CITL to ORBIS only for firms located in the countries where
we conducted our management interviews.
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Figure 19: Value at Stake and Trade Intensity in our sample
Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot at the 3-digit (NACE 1.1) industry level based on our interview sample. The size
of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given 4-digit industry. The figure reveals the position of various
sectors in the plane spanned by the two criteria proposed to exempt sectors from auctioning of permits and allocate them
for free.
located in one of the exempt categories, thus underestimating the non-exempt share. Panel b of Figure
20 repeats the exercise for the sample of firms which are included in our interview sample. This leads
to very similar distributions as for the ORBIS-matched CITL sample, confirming that our interview
sample is representative of the underlying population. In panel b we report both CO2 figures based
on actual emissions as well as permits allocated in 2008. As permits were by and large allocated on
the basis of emissions this leads to very similar results.24
We wish to evaluate whether or not the Commission’s criteria (TI and VaS) are indeed good proxies
to capture the risk of carbon leakage or job losses. Our survey question on the “Future impact of
climate change policies” (FI) lends itself to this exercise as it provides a direct measure of what the
Commission can only approximate by using the TI and VaS criteria (cf. question 12a in appendix B).
Firms scored high on this question if they could convince the interviewer that future efforts to put a
price on carbon will lead to a contraction or complete closure of the firm’s activities at the current
location. Thus, if the criteria of the Commission are accurate one would expect them to be positively
correlated with the FI variable. This test can be implemented in a regression of the FI variable on
these criteria as well as other explanatory variables:
24We cannot report CO2 emissions based on on EU Impact assessment data as these are only available at the sectoral,
not the firm level.
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Figure 20: The relative size of exemption groups
(a) Among all ETS firms in the six countries under study
(b) Among interviewed ETS firms
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Table 12: Correlations between “Future Impact” score and other variables
(1) (2)
Variables All ETS firms only
1 Cost pass through -0.107*** -0.109*
2 Non EU Competitors Share 0.141*** 0.135**
3 Non EU Competitors 0.02 -0.06
4 Competitors 0.02 -0.14
5 Share of sales exported to non EU -0.08 -0.03
6 Customers are mainly other Businesses 0.105*** 0.166***
7 Multinationals 0.01 -0.06
8 CC Related Products 0.01 0.01
9 CC Related Product Innovation -0.02 -0.04
10 CC Related Process Innovation 0.132*** 0.108*
11 Energy Monitoring 0.169*** 0.179***
12 Greenhouse Gas Monitoring 0.168*** 0.1
13 Energy Consumption Targets 0.074* 0
14 Greenhouse Gas Targets 0.207*** 0.160***
15 Enforcement of Targets 0.120*** 0.1
16 Employment 0.02 -0.06
17 Firm is in ETS 0.623***
Correlation with Future Impact of Climate Change 
Policy Score
FIi = βT IT Ii+βVaSVaSi+x′iβx+ εi (2)
where FIi is the Future Impact score of firm i from our survey and xi is a vector of other control
variables.
Before estimating this equation, we first conduct a series of internal consistency checks on the FI
variable. Specifically, we examine whether FI correlates in expected ways with other survey variables
that, while also capturing vulnerability to policy, are arguably less subjective than FI. An example
of such variables are those that measure the degree of international competition. Table 12 displays
pairwise correlations between the FI score and other survey variables. The first row shows that a high
cost pass-through – reflecting the better ability of firms to pass the cost impact on to its consumers – is
associated with lower FI scores. Rows 2 to 4 show correlations with different variables representing
competition from firms located outside the EU. Interestingly, it is only the share of EU external
competitors in overall competitors that is positively associated with FI at a statistically significant
level. This confirms the intuition that carbon leakage should only be a relevant concern for firms with
competition from outside the EU. Rows 11 to 15 demonstrate that scores given for the “measures”
questions are positively correlated with a high FI score in a statistically significant fashion. This is
plausible as one would expect that firms affected more by climate change policies are more pro-active
at pursuing measures to reduce their GHG intensity and permit liability. A similar argument applies
for climate change related process innovation which is found to be positively correlated with FI in
row 10. Finally, row 17 reveals that firms in the EU ETS report a higher expected impact of future
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Table 13: Regressions of “Future Impact” score on TI and VaS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Future Impact of Climate Change Policy Score (FI)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) -0.015 0.053 0.063 0.036 0.425*
(0.097) (0.128) (0.101) (0.107) (0.254)
Sectoral Value at Stake (VaS) 0.263*** 0.525** 0.256*** 0.322*** 0.541*** 0.023
(0.059) (0.230) (0.059) (0.095) (0.127) (0.122)
TI X TI 0.016
(0.084)
VaS X  VaS -0.049
(0.040)
TI X VaS 0.039 0.071 0.103 -0.003
(0.102) (0.090) (0.135) (0.110)
Import Intensity 0.078
(0.135)
Export Intensity -0.055
(0.132)
Noise Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weights no no no no no EMP CO2
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 363 363
climate change policy. The second column in Table 12 reports the same correlation coefficients based
on a sample of EU ETS firms only. Although the statistical significance of the correlation is lower in
some cases, the main qualitative results remain the same.
Having verified that the FI score is indeed a good measure of a firm’s vulnerability, we turn to the
results of the regression equation 2, displayed in Table 13. Columns 1 and 2 display the results
of univariate regressions of TI and VaS. The estimated coefficient on VaS indicates a positive and
statistically significant correlation with FI whereas the coefficient on TI is not statistically significant.
This finding holds up in column 3 where both measures are included simultaneously, as well as
quadratic polynomial terms to explore if non-linearities matter. For instance, TI could matter for very
high values of TI only, or only in interaction with high carbon intensity. There is no evidence of
such effects. In column 4 we split the TI measure into export and import intensity. This yields a
negative point estimate for import intensity and a positive point estimate for export intensity, neither
of which is statistically significant. Columns 5 through 7 report the results from a specification with
an interaction term and for different weights. Results from the unweighted regression are reported
in column 5, employment weights are used in column 6 and weights based on CO2 in column 7.
Employment weights do not change the qualitative findings but give rise to a larger estimate for the
impact on carbon intensity. This suggests that in particular larger firms with higher carbon intensity
are relatively more at risk of downsizing. In contrast, CO2 weights produce an insignificant coefficient
on VaS and a weakly significant coefficient on TI. Driving this result must be a few very large emitters
of carbon that tend to be more trade than carbon intensive. In sum, the results from regression equation
2 indicate that trade intensity is generally not a good indicator to measure the risk of downsizing or
out-sourcing whereas carbon intensity is.
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Table 14: Regressions of “Future Impact” score on sector groupings defined by the EU Commission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable FI>2
Vas>30 (A) 1.191*** 1.178*** 1.868*** 0.008 0.334*** 0.592*** -0.111
(0.297) (0.305) (0.460) (0.412) (0.098) (0.120) (0.177)
TI>30 & VaS>5 & VaS<30 (B) 0.323
(0.285)
TI<30 & TI>10 & VaS>5 & VaS<30 (C) 0.140 0.154 0.439** -0.945* 0.051 0.159 -0.313**
(0.246) (0.242) (0.202) (0.503) (0.093) (0.098) (0.146)
B & VaS>5 0.727** 1.188*** 0.769** 0.240** 0.512*** 0.290**
(0.365) (0.303) (0.383) (0.109) (0.140) (0.137)
B & VaS<5 0.015 -0.166 -0.748 0.013 -0.011 -0.188
(0.254) (0.308) (0.520) (0.090) (0.120) (0.210)
Noise Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Weights no no EMP CO2 no EMP CO2
Observations 363 363 363 363 363 363 363
Future Impact of Climate Change Policy Score 
(FI)
It could be argued that the continuous relationship between FI, VaS and TI imposed in equation 2 is not
appropriate for the Commission’s threshold based approach. We thus modify the estimation equation
to include a set of dummy variables representing the exemption categories (A,B,C) defined above and
in Figure 19 instead of the continuous variables. The reference category in the new regression is thus
given by firms that are not exempt from auctioning. Table 14 reports the results. Column 1 shows that
only the highly carbon intensive group (A) has an average FI score that is significantly higher than
the group without exemption – exactly how high is shown in Figure 21 which plots average values
for the different exempted groups along with 95% confidence bands. Panel a corresponds to column
1 from Table 14 and shows that the average score for group A is still well below 3 whereas the upper
boundary of the confidence bands just about reaches above 3.25 Thus even in group A there is no
dramatically high risk of downsizing or outsourcing for the average firm.
Based on these results one could thus conclude that handing out permits for free is justified only for
firms in group A whereas sectors in groups B or C should all be subject to auctioning. However,
group B is rather large and heterogeneous as it is comprised of a large fraction of firms and sectors
with very low carbon intensity (VaS<5%) but also of a minority of firms with intermediate energy
intensity (VaS>5 & VaS<30) (see Figure 19). In order to account for such heterogeneity, we further
subdivide group B into a group with low carbon intensity and one with intermediate carbon intensity.
Figure 22 plots the fraction of firms, employment and CO2 emissions that fall into those categories. It
turns out that while group B&VaS<5 accounts for more firms and employment, a much larger share of
emissions – according to our measure of CO2 emissions based on the CITL-ORBIS match – originates
from group B&VaS>5. When using the impact assessment CO2 figures it appears that the share of
emissions in group B & VaS<5 is larger however.
Column 2 of Table 14 reports the regression results when these separate groups are included along
with the groups A and C defined earlier. We find that the moderately carbon intensive part of group
25Recall that the survey grid suggests “Significant reduction (>10%) in production/employment due to outsourcing” for
a value of 3. See the full questionnaire in appendix B.
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Figure 21: Impact measures across “at risk” groups
(a) Three exemption groups (b) Four exemption groups
(c) Employment weights (d) CO2 weights
Figure 22: Subdividing the high trade intensity category
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B has indeed a signficantly higher downsizing risk than the reference group. The absolute average
FI score in that group is plotted in panel b of Figure 21. As is the case for group A, the risk of
downsizing or closure does not attain dramatically high levels for the average firm. Columns 3 and 4
of Table 14 report results from employment and CO2-weighted versions of the regression in column
2. The employment weighted regression in Column 3 confirms the results reported in column 2. That
is, the effects for both group A and group B&VaS<5 become stronger, suggesting that some of the
larger firms in terms of employment in those categories are more at risk. We now obtain a significantly
positive coefficient for group C. In absolute values, this group’s FI score is still far below the threshold
of 3 points. Using CO2 weights in column 4 yields an insignificant coefficient for group A while the
coefficient for group B&VaS>5 remains significant. This echoes the earlier finding in Column 7 of
Table 13, namely that there are a number of large emitters of CO2 with some downsizing risk that
have moderate carbon intensity but a high trade intensity.26 Figure 21c reports the implied average
scores all of which remain below 3. In sum, the changes in the regression coefficients when using
different weights emphasize that there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to downsizing risk
even within the more differentiated grouping into 4 exemption categories. This is illustrated as well
by Figure 23 which shows the raw distribution of FI scores within each of the groups defined above.
The reader should note that in every group there is a fraction of firms with a score of 3 or more.
In order to further distinguish between a slight increase in risk and a serious downsizing impact, we
modify the regressions to accommodate the binary event that a firm has a score of 2 or larger. This
approach is implemented as a Probit regression. The results are reported in columns 5 to 7 of Table
14 and confirm that only for groups A and B&VaS>5 there is some risk of downsizing to speak of.
On balance, the evidence presented in this section gives rise to three conclusions. First, the TI cri-
terion proposed by the EU Commission is only of very limited value in proxying a sector’s actual
downsizing risk. Second, looking more closely at the different groups defined by thresholds given by
the Commission we find that downsizing is an issue only for sectors with very high carbon intensity
(VaS>30%) and for sectors with very high trade and moderately high carbon intensity. Third, this
is suggestive of how the current Commission proposals could be improved with minimal changes to
current definitions and criteria. If exemption was granted only to groups A and B&VaS>5 but not to
group C, the amount of overall emission permits that could be auctioned would increase by at least
35 percentage points, from roughly 40% to 60% or more based on the shares reported in Figure 22
and depending on which CO2 measure is used. While having a minimal impact on leakage risk, such
a modification to the rules would generate additional revenue for governments that could be used to
directly fund infrastructure or R&D relevant for GHG emissions reductions as well as to compensate
lower income groups for the likely regressiveness of higher energy prices due to carbon pricing. We
derive an estimate of savings for government using the following formula:
∆Revenue = (sC + sB&VaS<5%)×CO2Manu f acturing×PCO2
26Closer inspection reveals that this result is primarily driven by NACE 1.1. sector 2710 Manufacture of basic iron and
steel and of ferro-alloys. See Table 15 on page 56 for a classification of sectors.
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The formula multiplies the fraction of CO2 emissions of industries in categories C and B&VaS<5%
by an estimate of total manufacturing emissions times a permit price in the EU ETS. To estimate
manufacturing emissions we subtract emissions from the CITL combustion sector from the total sum
of emissions reported in the CITL. The rationale is that the combustion sector primarily (though not
exclusively) includes power plants. Excluding the entire combustion sector should thus lead to a
conservative estimate of total manufacturing emissions. For the permit price we assume C30 in line
with the assumptions made in the Commission’s Impact Asessment. This leads to an estimate of C7
billion when using the emission shares based on the CITL-ORBIS match and C9.4 billion when using
shares based on the IA figures.
To conclude this section it is worthwhile to point out that even after splitting group B in two there
still remains much heterogeneity in the policy impact within the groups defined by the various policy
thresholds. Figure 23 illustrates this by reporting various distributions of the FI score for the different
groups. We see that in each of the groups defined on the basis of the VaS and TI thresholds there are
firms that report high FI scores and those that report no impact of future policy at all. This suggests
that a lot might be gained by a more fundamental overhaul of the criteria that exempt firms from
auctioning. For example it might be possible that more refined criteria based on trade could perform
better. As we have seen in Table 13, splitting the trade criterion into exports and imports suggests
that import intensity is somewhat more closely related to FI. A further refinement could be achieved
by distinguishing between imports from other Annex I countries and emerging economies with less
Climate Change related regulation such as China. We leave such refinements as a topic for future
research. Regardless of how well sector-level criteria for free allocation are defined, however, the
efficiency of these allocations could be improved if vulnerable firms were targeted directly instead of
targeting the entire industry. This idea will be explored in detail in the next section.
7 Improving the permit allocation process
The previous section showed that most of the sectors exempt from auctioning under the latest plans
of the EU Commission do not appear to be at increased risk of carbon leakage or threatened in their
competitiveness. At the same time we saw that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the vulner-
ability (FI) score. In fact, even within the group that is currently not exempt from auctioning, there
are a number firms with rather high impact scores (see Figure 23). Conversely, in sectors that exhib-
ited higher vulnerability on average, there are many firms that reported no impact of climate change
policy at all. This suggests that allocating permits on a sectoral basis is too crude and that support
to vulnerable firms could be provided - at least in principle - in a more efficient way. In this section
we develop general principles of an efficient permit allocation at the firm level and examine by how
much the optimal allocation improves upon the one envisioned by the EU Commission. In regards to
the practical implementation of our scheme to improve permit allocation, we explore a strategy based
on observable and objectively measurable firm characteristics.
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Figure 23: Distribution of the FI score
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Table 15: Sector classification
Sector NACE Sectors CITL 2008 sectors
Food/Tobacco 15, 16
Textile/Leather 17, 18, 19
Wood&Paper 20,21 9
Publishing 22
Fuels 23 2,3
Chemical&Plastic 24, 25
Glass 261 7
Ceramics 262 8
Cement 264, 265,266 6
Other Minerals 267, 268
271, 272, 273, 275 5
274
Fabricated Metals 28
Machinery&Optics 29, 30, 31,33
32
Vehicles 34,35
36
Iron&Stee
OtherBasicMetals
TVCommunication
Furniture/nec
Notes: NACE Sectors refer to NACE 1.1
7.1 Towards an optimal permit allocation
To derive an optimal permit allocation we first need to define a criterion for comparing different
allocations. The legislation behind the EU ETS stipulates that the system should be designed so as
to avoid carbon leakage and minimise the risk to domestic jobs and competitiveness. As shown in
Appendix A, this can be translated into an objective function for governments which depends on
each firm’s likelihood of exit multiplied by its size in terms of either employment or CO2 emissions,
or both. Much of the debate on emissions suggests that firms that are most at risk should receive
more permits. However, as we show more formally in Appendix A, in order to allocate a given
amount of permits most efficiently we need to equalise the marginal contributions of each firm to the
government’s objective function. For instance, there might be firms that are at a heightened risk of
closing down or moving abroad because of climate change policy. Giving them additional permits
for free, however, has little effect on this decision if the leakage vulnerability is driven by effects of
carbon pricing on electricity prices or via upstream or downstream linkages. Clearly, the regulator’s
criterion for allocating free permits across firms should be based on the marginal impact of a free
permit, i.e. the reduction in leakage risk achieved by the last free permit.
But how can the marginal impact of free permits on a firm’s behaviour be determined? We are basing
our assessment here again on the interviews with managers of EU manufacturing firms. We asked
them not only to assess the likely future impact of climate change policy on their businesses but
also whether this impact would be different if permits were allocated for free, rather than auctioned.
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Figure 24: Impact of free allocation on the downsizing score
Notes: Grouping firms by their vulnerability score the bars shows by how much the vulnerability score would drop if a
firm receives 80
Figure 24 illustrates the information we derive from this question. For every vulnerability score it
reports the distribution of the change in vulnerability implied by a free allocation corresponding to
80% of a company’s emissions. This shows for example, that almost 20% of the firms that responded
that climate change policies were likely to force them to close down or re-locate also reported that
receiving free permits would have no impact on this decision. On the other hand, for almost 20%
of firms with a top score of 5, free allocation of permits would reduce the impact by 4 score points;
implying that there would be no downsizing due to climate change policies.
7.2 Calculating marginal leakage probabilities
We translate the vulnerability scores into leakage risk probabilities as follows: A score of 5 is inter-
preted as a 99% probability that the firm will exit. The scores of 3 and 1 are associated with exit
probabilities of 10% and 0% respectively. For scores 4 and 2 we simply interpolate between these
numbers, as is shown in Table 16. We then assume a logistic probability model to describe the impact
of free allocations on exit probabilities:
Pi (Ai) =
1
1+ exp(β0i+β1iAi)
Thus, the probability of exiting is a declining function of free permits Ai bounded between 0 and 1.
Figure 25 illustrates this. We identify the parameters in this function, β0i and β1i, from the response
to our questions regarding vulnerability with no permits and 80% free permits; i.e.
β0i = ln
(
1
Pi (0)
−1
)
and β1i =
[
ln
(
1
Pi (80% ·CO2i) −1
)
−β0i
]
(80% ·CO2i)−1
The marginal impact on firm exit of an additional unit of free permits for firm i is given by
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Table 16: Mapping vulnerability scores into exit probabilities
Vulnerability Score Exit probability
5 99%
4 55%
3 10%
2 5%
1 0.01%
Figure 25: The shape of the exit probability function
∂Pi (Ai)
∂Ai
= β1i
−exp(β0i+β1iAi)
(1+ exp(β0i+β1iAi))2
(3)
Note that this is always negative as allocating more permits for free can only reduce the exit probabil-
ity. If a firm has no permits allocated yet, the marginal impact of the first unit is equal to−βi exp(β0i)1+exp(β0i) .
Governments should allocate free permits first to firms where the absolute value of this marginal
probability is highest. Figure 26 reports averages of the absolute value of the marginal impact at
zero allocation across sectors. In panel (a) we see the marginal impact is highest in Other Minerals,
Fabricated Metals, and Machinery & Optics. Panels (b) and (c) show averages weighted with firms’
CO2 emissions and employment, respectively. This highlights that a regulator concerned with either
CO2 leakage or employment, rather than firm exit as such, might adopt a different strategy. While
Fabricated Metals keeps exhibiting high marginal impact in either case, Ceramics emerges as another
sector worth supporting if CO2 leakage is the prime concern. However, one should point out that,
particularly for the CO2-weighted case there appears to be substantial within sector heterogeneity, as
indicated by the confidence bands. We therefore explore in the next sub-section how permits can be
allocated more efficiently when these firm-level variations are more explicitly taken into account.
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Figure 26: The marginal impact on exit probabilities
(a) Averages across firms (b) CO2 weighted averages
(c) Employment weighted Averages
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7.3 Optimal permit allocations
This section shows how a given reduction in the risk of carbon leakage or job loss can be achieved
with a minimal amount of permits. We also show how a given amount of permits can be allocated in
a way that minimises leakage and jobs risks to levels far below that of current allocation proposals.
The key idea is to allocate free permits only to firms where the marginal benefits of permit allocation
are highest, thereby equalising marginal benefits.
In more formal terms we show results from optimising two types of objective functions:
1. Minimising allocated permits subject to a constraint on the risk of job loss or carbon leakage:
min
Ai
∑
i
Ai s.t. ∑
i
Pi (Ai)× (θEmploymenti+(1−θ)CO2i) = O˜ (4)
2. Minimising the risk of job loss and leakage subject to a constraint on freely allocated permits:
min
Ai
∑
i
Pi (Ai)× (θEmploymenti+(1−θ)CO2i) s.t. ∑
i
Ai = A˜ (5)
where θ measures the extent the government values job loss concern relative to carbon leakage con-
cerns. In our results below we consider two extreme cases, namely that the government is either
concerned about jobs only (θ = 1) or about leakage only (θ = 0).
Both programs require that all firms receiving free permits should have equal marginal impacts.27
Since the marginal exit probabilities are non-linear and non monotonic in allocated permits, solv-
ing the program is not trivial. A detailed description of the solution algorithm is relegated to the
appendix.28
Depending on the objective function and arguments to optimise we can derive a series of different
optimal allocations. In this section we compare eight different types of such allocations which are
detailed in Table 17. Thus, we derive two optimal allocations by holding the risk to jobs constant
relative to complete free allocation and the 2009 proposal but minimising allocated permits. We
derive another two by holding the CO2 leakage risk constant. Further, we derive four allocations
that minimise the risk of job loss or carbon leakage and holding the amount of permits fixed at two
different levels.
In Figure 27 we compare those with both, complete free allocation of all permits as well as with
27There may be corner solutions where firms might not receive any permits at all because the marginal impact of giving
them just one permit is insufficient.
28We use current data on employment and CO2. Strictly speaking we should use values conditional on a potentially
higher future carbon price which we will address in future research. Using current values is however a useful and conser-
vative benchmark.
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Table 17: Various optimal allocations
Reference Allocation
Objective Constraint Value for θ
min free permits Risk to jobs θ=1 o.1 o.2
min free permits
CO2 leakage risk θ=0 o.3 o.4
min job risk
θ=1 a.1 a.2
θ=0 a.3 a.4
Complete 
Free 
Allocation
EU proposal 
from 2009
Aggregate 
number of 
permits allocated 
for freemin CO2 leakage 
risk
the allocation implied by the recent Commission proposals.29 In panel a we start by looking at the
share of jobs (in employment at ETS firms) that are at risk due to carbon pricing. The first bar of the
figure shows that even with complete free allocation of permits there remains a residual risk to jobs
of more than 4%. From the second bar we see however that this risk can be reduced to just above 3%
by allocating permits more efficiently; i.e. giving some firms more permits than their current carbon
emissions and others less. For the allocation underlying the second bar we minimise the risk to jobs
(θ = 1) whereas in the third bar we have minimised only carbon leakage risk (θ = 0). Comparing the
second and third bar we see that the outcome in terms of jobs is the same. Thus optimising according
to any criterion is much better for either objective compared to not optimising at all. In bars 4 to 6 we
compare the allocation implied by the new EU allocation rules (bar 4) with two different allocations
where the same number of permits is distributed efficiently. A similar pattern emerges in that free
permits given only to sectors the Commission deems at risk leads to relatively high impact on jobs of
just above 10%. Allocating the same number of permits optimally in turn brings down the risk to the
risk incurred when allocating all permits in an optimised way – slightly over 3%. Again, there is no
difference between applying either the jobs or carbon criterion.
Panel b examines carbon leakage risks across the same six allocations. This leads to a qualitatively
very similar pattern. It is worth pointing out, however, that in terms of the carbon risk the increase
between bar 1 and 4 – i.e. between allocating all permits for free and according to the latest Com-
mission proposals – is smaller than for the job risk. This is because this allocation does not at all take
29In doing so we do not (yet) account for benchmarking but rather assume that in a sector that is eligible for free permits
all firms receive allocations corresponding to their current emissions.
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into account differences in employment size between different firms but only differences in carbon
emissions.
In panel c we compare the share of permits that are handed out for free restricting either job or carbon
risk to various levels. By definition, under complete free allocation, 100% of permits are allocated
for free (bar 1). The same risk to jobs as this allocation could be achieved with a vastly lower price
tag of about 30% of freely allocated permits as bar 2 shows. To achieve the same risk in terms of
carbon leakage is slightly cheaper (bar 3). As shown by bar 4, the new allocation rules by the EU
Commission imply that a large fraction of permits will continue to be allocated for free, which is
consistent with the findings of the previous section.30 Again, what is achieved with those permits
could be provided at a much lower cost. This is particular true for job risk which, according to bar
5, is very similar to the risk incurred when about 10% of permits are allocated for free. Maintaining
carbon leakage risk fixed at the levels induced by the latest EU proposals, bar 6 shows that in the best
case an allocation of about 20% of permits for free is required.
It is instructive to compare the various allocations with respect to their distribution effects. One
way to think about free permits is as a subsidy firms receive. In Figure 28 we show histograms of
the distribution of subsidies per job implied by the various allocations. For that purpose we follow
the assumption of the EU Impact Assessment and assume a carbon price of C30 per tonne of CO2.
Consider first the distribution implied by complete free allocation shown in the top left of Figure 28.
It is striking that some firms receive a rather large amount of money per employee. For example there
are almost 20% of firms receiving between C10,000 and C100,000 per employee. A small fraction
receives more than C100,000. This pattern is similar in the top right figure which reports the same
statistics for the permit allocation implied by the 2009 proposals, with the difference that about 40%
of firms receive no free permits. The histograms in the second row explore the distribution of free
allocations that is needed to achieve the same risk to jobs as in row one, when allocating permits more
efficiently. In very few cases would this justify allocating more than C100,000 per job to a firm. To
achieve the same risk as the one implied by the 2009 proposals, few firms should receive more than
C5000 per job. The last row shows the same figures when keeping CO2 leakage risk to the same
levels as in row 1. No firm would receive more than C100,000 per job.
The histograms in Figure 28 underline that giving out permits on the basis of current emissions can
lead to excesses that are not supported by neither concern for jobs or carbon leakage. They also
motivate that an improved allocation could potentially be achieved by taking into account not only
the amount of emissions of a firm but also its size in terms of employment. We examine this idea in
detail in the next section.
30The share of permits allocated for free is slightly larger than in Figure 20 in the previous section because in this
section we consider the sample of firms that we interviewed and that can be matched to both ORBIS and CITL. In Figure
20 we considered the sample of CITL installations we could match to ORBIS which is a slightly larger sample.
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Figure 27: Comparison of optimal and actual/planned allocations
(a) Share of jobs at risk (b) Share of CO2 at risk under various allocations
(c) Share of permits allocated for free
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Figure 28: Implied subsidies per job
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7.4 Feasible optimal permit allocation
In the computation of the optimal firm-level allocation of free permits we have used two scores from
our interviews to estimate the (marginal) propensity to relocate. The practical implementation of our
approach is complicated by the fact that it is difficult for the regulator to elicit truthful information on
this from all firms in the EU ETS. Here we explore whether easily observable firm characteristics can
be used as proxies to generate a similar allocation.
The approach we have in mind involves several steps. The first step taken by the regulator is to decide
on the share of permits that will be handed out for free. For the purpose of this exercise, we assume
this share to just under 30% which gives rise to the same risk of carbon leakage as allocating all
permits for free following EU criteria (cf. the third bar in Figure 27c). The next step is to decide how
to allocate this total amount across firms. We thus run a regression of the permit shares implied by
our optimal allocations on firm level employment and CO2 emissions as these are variables readily
available to the Commission. The regression equation is given by
A∗i
∑i A∗i
=
1
1+ exp(βE lnEMPi+βC lnCO2i)
+ εi (6)
where we use a logistic function to ensure that predictions from this regression are between 0 and 1.
Finally, to obtain “feasible” firm level allocations, we multiply these shares with the total number of
permits we wish to allocate.
Table 18 reports the parameter estimates from non-linear least-squares estimates of equation (6).
Confirming intuition, the coefficient on employment is positive and significant (at the 10% level)
in the regression proxying the allocation which is optimised to protect employment. In contrast,
employment enters the regression in column 2 with a negative (though not significant) coefficient.
The CO2emission level enters both equations with positive and statistically signficant coefficients,
indicating that both optimal allocation schemes assign more free permits to large emitters.
In Figure 29 we examine how well our proxy allocations perform when it comes to reducing risk to
jobs (in panel a) and CO2 leakage (in panel b). For ease of comparison, the first four bars report the
leakage risk implied by each of the four allocations we consider. The last two bars in each figure
refer to the two proxy allocations we consider; i.e. one which proxies for the optimal allocation
based on job risk and one which proxies for the optimal allocation based on CO2 risk. In both cases,
the proxy allocations give rise to higher levels of risk than the respective optimal allocations (in
bars 3 and 4). However, for job risk the proxy allocations remain below the risk levels implied by
the 2009 proposal. For CO2 they are somewhat above the 2009 levels. Note, however, that this is
achieved while distributing just about one third of the amount of free permits stipulated by the 2009
proposal. Thus we conclude that basing permit allocation not only on CO2 but also an index featuring
employment could increase the efficiency of the allocation process considerably. Refining this index
by considering further indicators and metrics at the disposal of the authorities will be a topic for future
research.
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Table 18: Regressions of optimal allocations on employment and CO2
(1) (2)
Share of free permits optimised for
Jobs
Employment 0.15* -0.12
(0.09) (0.10)
CO2 0.40*** 0.76***
(0.07) (0.12)
N 405 405
0.20 0.25
CO
2
R2
Notes: Non-linear least-squares regressions of equation (6).
Figure 29: Performance of proxy allocations
(a) Share of jobs at risk
(b) Share of CO2 at risk
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8 Conclusion
This study provides first results from a new evidence base for the evaluation of climate change policy
in Europe. Using an innovative, bias-reducing method that emerged from research on management
performance, we interviewed almost 800 European managers about aspects of firm performance and
practices related to climate change. Focusing on the impact of the EU ETS on the competitiveness
of firms, our study presents evidence that the criteria the European Commission has adopted in order
to assess the negative effects of permit allocation on the competitiveness of firms and sectors are ill-
defined. The likely consequences are sizeable windfall profits at the taxpayer’s expense and welfare
losses entailed by distortions to the market structure in the affected sectors. Hence there is a strong
mandate for environmental regulation to mitigate such negative side effects.
To guide regulation, we have presented a normative model of permit allocation at the firm level. This
model allows us to compute permit allocations that minimize the risk of job loss or the risk of carbon
leakage for a given amount of free permits to be handed out. At the heart of our model is the insight
that minimising exit risk requires that the marginal exit probabilities be equalised across firms. Sim-
ulations show that reallocating the permits earmarked for free distribution under EU plans in optimal
ways can further reduce those risks by a substantial margin. Conversely, the risk levels implied by cur-
rent EU plans can be achieved at a fraction of the cost in terms of foregone government revenue from
permit auctions. To be sure, the practical implementation of the improved permit allocation scheme
must be based on objectively measurable firm characteristics that are observable to the regulator.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions in future research. First, a better
understanding of firm behaviour on the allowance market is needed. This is worthwhile pursuing
not only from an academic point-of-view but also because the cost-effectiveness of a cap-and-trade
scheme crucially depends on firms equalising their marginal abatement cost to the permit price. If
frictions prevent this adjustment, the price tag that comes with emissions trading might be higher than
that of alternative regulatory instruments.
Another question to be answered in future research is the classical evaluation question: How effective
has the EU ETS been at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At the firm-level, abatement efforts can
take different forms, such as changes in management practices, adoption of better technologies or
more R&D into climate-friendly processes and products. Our interview dataset contains rich infor-
mation on each of these channels.
Finally, improving the rules for allocating free permits is a pressing policy issue which can benefit
tremendously from incorporating more economic wisdom. One way of achieving this objective is
by refining the trade intensity criterion at the sector level in a way that better captures detrimental
effects of foreign competition on competitiveness. Another way is to devise a feasible strategy for the
regulator to implement optimal permit allocations at the firm level.
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A Optimal Permit Allocation
In a cap-and-trade scheme, the permit price is determined by the total cap and the marginal cost
schedules of all regulated firms. Therefore, the way in which the total cap is allocated across firms
has no bearing on marginal production decisions. However, the proportion of free permits a firm
receives has a direct effect on firm profits and hence affects firm behaviour at the extensive margin.
In Section 7 we proposed a normative framework that would allow for a more efficient allocation
of free permits. This section details our solution algorithm. We start by proposing an algorithm for
the problem described in equation (5); i.e. minimising the risk of either job loss or carbon leakage
conditional on a limited amount of permits to be allocated for free. We then show that the reverse
problem described in equation (4) can be solved with the same algortihm by slightly re-writing the
problem.
To solve the problem in constrained optimisation program (5) we can minimise the Lagrangian func-
tion
L =∑
i
Pi (Ai)×Di -λ
(
∑
i
Ai− A˜
)
(7)
where (θEmploymenti+(1−θ)CO2i) and λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Given the assumptions on Pi, an additional free permit can always bring about a marginal reduction
in the probability of relocation. Hence the shadow value of the permit, λ , is positive and the permit
constraint holds with equality. The first-order conditions w.r.t. Ai are given by
P′i (Ai)Di ≤ λ ∀i (8)
The interpretation of inequality (8) is that the regulator seeks to equalize, in each firm, the expected
gain in jobs and emission savings brought about by the last free permit allocated to the firm.31
Solution algorithm Because of the non-linearity and non-concavity of P(·) and the possibility of
corner solutions, finding an analytical solution to the system of inequalities given by (8) is cum-
bersome. However, equation (7) is suggestive of how the problem can be solved numerically in an
efficient manner. The structure of the problem is akin to a dynamic ‘cake eating’ problem (see e.g.
Adda and Cooper, 2003), with the difference that the ‘cake’ is not distributed over time but among
firms. For an arbitrary but fixed ordering of firms, we can write the problem in a recursive fashion
using the value function
31To appreciate the emphasis on the marginal relocation probability, consider two firms with identical levels of employ-
ment and abatement but with different relocation probabilities. The first-order condition (8) implies that the government
should not allocate most free permits to the firm with the highest propensity to relocate abroad but rather to the firm where
these permits bring about the largest reduction in the relocation probability. Although this insight follows immediately
from straightforward economic reasoning, it seems to have gotten lost in the heat of the public debate on free permit
allocation.
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Vi (Ci) = max
0≤Ai≤Ci
{−Pi (Ai)Di+Vi+1 (Ci−Ai)} (9)
where Ci is the amount of total permits left when reaching firm i in the sequence and Vi+1 (Ci−Ai) is
the value of leaving the amount Ci−Ai of permits to all remaining firms in the sequence.
To implement this computationally, we recursively solve equation (9) by working backwards from the
last firm I in the sequence with value function
VI (CI) =−Φ(−∆pii− pcCI−λ ) [θLI (pc)+(1−θ)EI (pc)] .
where Φ is a double exponential c.d.f., ∆pi is the difference in firm profits due to carbon pricing and
pCCI is the subsidy a firm obtains in the form of free permits. Moreover, L denotes the number of
workers in the firm and E is the amount of emissions, both expressed as functions of the permit price
pC. For firms earlier in the sequence, we recursively use equation (9) to choose the optimal Ai for
each possible Ci.
For a given Ci there are Ci+1 possible choices for Ai, assuming that permits cannot be split and that
Ai = 0 is an option as well. Given the total number of permits A, Ci can take A+ 1 possible values.
Hence the number of outcomes to be compared in step i is given by
(A+1)+(A+0)+(A−1)+ ...+1+0 = 1
2
(A+1)A
and the total number of operations needed to solve the problem becomes (I− 1)× 12 (A+1)A (as it
is always optimal to give the last firm the full amount of remaining permits). This number grows
linearly with the number of firms and quadratically with the number of permits, i.e. much slower than
the number of possible allocations of permits to firms (equivalent to drawing a firm for each of the A
permits with resampling), given by (A+I−1)!I!(A−1)! .
32
This approach can be applied to a range of different specifications of the relocation probability and
objective functions. In particular we can re-write problem 4 so that we can solve it with the same
approach. To see this note that by virtue of being a cumulative probability function, Pi (·) is monotone
in Ai which means we can invert it and write the problem in Equation 4 as
min
Ri
∑Ai (Ri) s.t.
(
∑
i
Ri ≤ R¯
)
where Ri is job or leakage risk contribution arising from firm i
Ri = P(Ai)Di
and R¯ is aggregate risk allowed.
32The computations are implemented in STATA 10 and the code – including a generic command called “cake.ado” – is
available from the authors on request.
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Questionnaire
Questons Values Coding descripton
I. Introducton
1. A bit about your business
(a) Is your frm a multnatonal? If yes, where is the headquarters?
(b) On how many producton sites do you operate (globally)? 
(c) How many of these sites are situated in the EU?
(d) How many of these sites are situated in the UK/B/FR/...?
no, list of countries, dk, rf “No”, if not a multnatonal;  country where headquarters is located if a 
multnatonal
number, dk, rf
number, dk, rf
Number of sites globally (approximate if unsure)
Number of sites in the EU
number, dk, rf Number of sites in current country 
2. A bit about you
(a) Job ttle text
(b) Tenure in company number, rf
(c) Tenure in current post number, rf
(d) Managerial background commercial, technical, law, other 
3. EU ETS involvement
As you might know, the European Union Emissions Trading System 
(referred to as EU ETS, hereafer) is at the heart of European 
climate change policy.
(a) Is your company (or parts thereof) regulated under the EU
ETS? 
(b) Since when?
(c) How many of your European business sites are covered by the 
EU ETS?
no, list of years 2005-2009, yes dk 
year, dk, rf
number, dk, rf
4. Site locaton
For single plant frms and interviewees based at a producton site:
Could you tell me the postcode of the business site where you are 
based?
text Records the postcode
Questons Values Coding descripton
For mult-plant frms where the interviewee is located at a non-
producton site:
Some of the questons I am going to ask you next are specifc to a 
producton site within your frm. Please choose a partcular 
producton site and answer my questons for the partcular site 
throughout the interview. The site should be the one you know 
best, the largest one, or the one nearest to you. If you are in the 
EU ETS, please pick a site covered by the EU ETS.  Could you tell 
me the postcode of the chosen site?
II. Impact of EU ETS
5. EU ETS stringency (If not an EU ETS frm, contnue with queston 9)
(a) How tough is the emissions cap/quota currently imposed by 
the EU ETS on your producton site?
(b) Can you describe some of the measures you put in place to 
comply with the cap?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low Cap is at business as usual.
Mid Some adjustments seem to have taken place, however nothing which 
led to fundamental changes in practces; e.g. insulaton, etc.
High Measures which led to fundamental changes in producton processes; 
e.g. fuel switching; replacement of essental plant and machinery.
(c) What is the annual cost burden of being part of the EU ETS?
For example, monitoring, verifcaton and transacton costs; the 
cost of buying permits or reducing emissions.
If the manager does not understand the queston:
Imagine your installaton was not part of the EU ETS this year, 
what cost saving would your frm do?
number
percentage
Absolute number
Or percentage of annual operatng cost
6. EU ETS management
Ask only mult-plant frms:
Is EU ETS compliance managed on the producton site or 
elsewhere?
site, other site, natonal frm, 
european frm, dk, rf, na
7. ETS trading
(a) In March of this year (i.e. before the compliance process), long, short, balanced, dk, rf, na
text If the manager happens to menton the detailed number of allowances, make a 
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what was your allowance positon on this site?
(b) Were you short or long in allowances?
note of it in this feld.
(c) Before the compliance process in April, did you buy or sell 
allowances on the market or over the counter from other frms?
(d) If not, why not?
buy, sell, both, no: only trading 
during compliance period, no: no 
need, no: image concerns, no: 
transacton costs, no: other, dk, rf, 
na
(e) If yes, how frequently? daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, 
bi-annual, yearly, dk, rf, na
(f) In April this year, what was your positon afer
the compliance process?
If answers "long": Did you bank permits for future
years? Why?
banking to emit more in following 
years, banking to sell at a higher 
ETS permit price in future, banking 
dk why, long for pooling, dk, rf, na
Banking reason.
If answers "balanced/compliant" or "short": Did you
borrow permits from next year's allowance? Why?
borrowing to emit less in following 
years, borrowing to buy at a lower 
ETS permit price in future, 
borrowing to be compliant, 
borrowing dk why, rf, dk, na 
Borrowing reason. Note: Only choose "borrowing to be compliant" if the  
manager is very short sighted and doesn't seem to understand he will  
eventually have to either emit less or buy permits
If answers "short": Why did you remain short? short for pooling, short and paid 
fne, other, rf, dk, na
Short reason.
text If “other”: why?
(g) Has this site exchanged emission permits with other 
installatons belonging to your company that are part of the EU 
ETS? (pooling)
yes, no, rf, dk, na
8. Ratonality of market behaviour
(a) How do you decide how many permits to buy or sell or trade at 
all?
(b) Did you base this decision on any forecast about prices and/or 
energy usage?
(c) Did you trade permit revenue of against emission reducton 
costs in your planning on this issue?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low Take their permit allocaton as a target to be met as such and do not 
take into account the price of permits or the cost of abatement. Just sell 
if there is a surplus or buy if there is a defcit.
Mid Are in the process of learning how the market works and in the frst 
years did not have any market driven attude, but now have someone in 
charge of managing the ETS so as to minimize compliance cost. This 
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person has experience in fnancial markets and sometmes interacts with 
the producton manager.
High Company has a thorough understanding of the site-specifc CO2 
abatement cost curve. Trading is used as a tool to reduce compliance 
cost and to generate extra revenues from excess abatement. Moreover, 
company forms expectatons about permit price and re-optmizes 
abatement choice if necessary. Trader resorts to futures and derivatves 
to manage ETS permits as a fnancial asset.
9. Antcipaton of phase III
(a) Do you expect to be part of the EU ETS from 2012 onwards?
If not, contnue with queston 10
yes, no, dk, rf, na
(b) How stringent do you expect the next phase of the EU ETS 
(from 2012 to 2020) to be?
(c) Will it be tough for your frm to reach such a target? Can you 
describe some of the measures you would have to put in place?
(d) Do you believe the allowances will be distributed through an 
auctoning mechanism?
(e) Is it likely that sanctons for non-compliance will become more 
stringent?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low Cap for phase III is antcipated to be comparable to business as usual. 
The manager believes there will be no additonal sanctons and that 
they will receive the permits for free.
Mid Phase III is likely to trigger some adjustments, however nothing that will 
lead to fundamental changes in practces. Only a small part of permits 
will be auctoned and sanctons are not expected to be very high.
High The presence of strong sanctons, extensive use of auctoning and more 
stringent targets in Phase III is antcipated. It is likely to imply the 
adopton of measures which will lead to fundamental changes in 
producton processes. It might also imply the closure of the plant, or
redundancy of more than 20% of employment.
(f) Do you expect to transfer unused (banked) ERUs or CERs from 
Phase II to Phase III ?
Note: ERUs are Emission Reducton Units stemming from Joint  
Implementaton projects. CERs are Certfed Emission Reductons
stemming from Clean Development Mechanism projects.
EUAs, ERUs, CERs, EUAs and ERUs, 
EUAs and CERs, ERUs and CERs, all 
three, no, dk, rf, na
10. Awareness
(a) Are climate change topics discussed within your business? Can 
you give examples?
(b) Are climate change related issues formally discussed in 
1-5, dk, rf, na Note: Give minimum score of 3 to ETS frms and probe directly for 4 or 5,  
skipping (a) and (b).
Low Don't know if threat or opportunity. No awareness.
Mid Some awareness backed up by evidence that this is being
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management meetngs? Can you give examples?
(c) Do your strategic objectves menton climate change?
(d) Did you commission reports or studies on how climate change 
will afect your business?
formally discussed by management.
High Evidence that climate change is an important part of the
business strategy.
Mentoned positve impact: yes, no
III. Prices
11a Energy price expectatons
By how many percent do you expect energy prices to go up or 
down by 2020?
percentage, dk, rf
percentage, dk, rf
percentage, dk, rf
Expected price change in percent of today's price.
Note: This price includes the efect of current and future climate change policies  
on the energy price.
Upper bound on expected price change – record only if interviewee mentons it.
Lower bound on expected price change – record only if interviewee mentons it.
11b Carbon price expectatons
(a) As you might know, the EU has commited to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20%-30% over the next decade. 
What price do you expect to pay for emitng one tonne of CO2 in 
2020?
percentage, dk, rf Expected price in Euros per ton of CO2.
percentage, dk, rf Or expected price change in percent of today's price.
yes, no, rf, dk Knows today's price of CO2.
(b) What price do you expect in the worst-case scenario? Upper bound in Euros per ton of CO2.
(c) What price do you expect in the best-case scenario? Lower bound in Euros per ton of CO2.
12. Future impact of carbon pricing
(a) Do you expect that government eforts to put a price on 
carbon emissions will force you to outsource parts of the 
producton of this business site in the foreseeable future, or to 
close down completely?
1-5, dk, rf Low No impact of this kind.
Mid Signifcant reducton (>10%) in producton/employment due to 
outsourcing.
High Complete close-down.
(b) What carbon price do you associate with this scenario?
(Assume that you would have to pay for all allowances.)
Note: The price relates to the scenario given under (a). If  
answered "no impact" under (a), skip this queston.
number, dk, rf, na Euros per ton
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(c) How would your answer to the previous questons change, if 
you received a free allowance for 80% of your current emissions?
Note: If answered "no impact" under (a), skip this queston.
1-5, dk, rf, na Low No impact of this kind.
Mid Signifcant reducton (>10%) in producton/employment due to 
outsourcing.
High Complete close-down.
(d) Note: Only ask if answered "no impact" under (a).
At what carbon price level would you be forced to close your plant 
down?
If the manager has no idea or says it would need to be very high, 
try diferent prices, startng high, for example: If you had to pay
200 Euros/ton of carbon, would you need to close down?
number, dk, na Euros per ton
(e) How did you reach this conclusion?
(f) How concrete are the plans for outsourcing or closure?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low Gut feeling of the manager.
Mid Response is based on a plausible argument. For example, interviewee 
discusses available technological optons and associated cost and relates 
them to proft margins.
High Commissioned a detailed study of abatement optons and associated 
cost (in-house or external).
(g) What fracton of an energy price or carbon price increase can 
you pass on to your customers?
percentage, dk, rf
IV. Competton and customers
13. Compettors
(a) Can you tell me the number of frms in the world which
compete with you in one or more local markets?
Note: For mult-product mult-plant frms refer to the market for  
the products created on the current site referred to during this  
interview. For instance, for mult-plant frms start the queston 
with "For the products produced at the producton site, can you  
tell me ..."
number, dk, rf
(b) How many of them are located within the EU? number, dk, rf
(c) How many of them are located in your country? number, dk, rf
(d) Locaton of main compettor (country) list of countries, dk, rf, na
Questons Values Coding descripton
(e) Do you know in which country your main compettor does 
most of its producton?
same, EU, non-EU, list of countries, 
dk, rf, na
14. Locaton of Customers
(a) Share of sales exported (to the EU and the rest of the world) percentage, dk, rf
(b) Share of sales exported to EU countries percentage, dk, rf
(c) Are your products sold mainly to consumers or to other 
businesses?
B2B, fnal customer, dk, rf
15. Customer pressure
(a) Are your customers concerned about your GHG emissions?
(b) How do they voice this concern?
(c) Do your customers require hard data on your carbon 
emissions?
1-5, dk, rf Low "B2C" - Not aware that emissions performance is of signifcant concern 
to consumers of their product.
"B2B" - Not aware that businesses they supply to are concerned about 
the emissions of the plant; quality and price are the only consideratons.
Mid "B2C" - The business is aware of the importance of climate-change 
issues in general and so are conscious that their customers may consider 
GHG performance to be important, although they do not expect or 
require data as proof.
"B2B" - Customers set ISO 14001 as a preconditon to suppliers. 
Evidence of environmental compliance is requested, but details of 
emissions fgures are not required.
High "B2C" - Being seen to reduce GHG emissions is thought to be important 
in the purchasing decisions of the frm's consumers. This has been 
determined by market research or consumers have voiced their concern 
through other means. Customers also ask for certfed data on emissions 
during producton or usage. A customer-friendly system to
recognize the best products in terms of energy efciency is ofen 
available in the market (e.g. EU energy efciency grade for home 
appliances).
"B2B" - Customers ask for evidence of external validaton of GHG 
fgures. Customers request informaton on carbon emissions as part of 
their own supply chain carbon auditng. Customers conform to PAS 2050 
or other natonal standard in carbon foot-printng and so require 
Questons Values Coding descripton
detailed informaton on a regular basis.
16 Climate change related product innovaton
(a) Globally, is your company currently trying to develop new 
products that help your customers to reduce GHG emissions?
(b) Can you give examples?
(c) What fracton of your Research & Development funds are used 
for that? (Less than 10%, more than 10%?)
1-5, dk, rf Low No eforts to develop climate change related
products.
Mid Some eforts but it is not the main objectve of
the frms R&D eforts.
High The frm is focusing all product R&D eforts
on climate change.
V. Measures
17. Energy monitoring
(a) How detailed is your monitoring of energy usage? 
(b) How ofen do you monitor your energy usage? Since when?
(c ) Describe the system you have in place.
1-5, dk, rf Low No monitoring apart from looking at the energy bill.
Mid Evidence of energy monitoring as opposed to looking at the energy bill, 
i.e. there is some consciousness about the amount of energy being used 
as a business objectve. However, discussions are irregular and not part 
of a structured process and are more frequent with price rises.  Not 
more than quarterly monitoring of energy. 
High Energy use is measured and monitored constantly and is on the agenda 
in regular producton meetngs. Energy use in the plant is divided up in 
space (by producton line, machine or similar) and monitored over tme 
(daily, hourly or contnuously). The amount of energy rather than the 
cost is focused on. 
2000 and earlier, list of years 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
Start date (put “na” if score is “1”)
18. Targets on energy consumpton for management
(a) Do you have any targets on energy consumpton which 
management has to observe? (e.g. kWh of electricity)
no targets, relatve quantty 
targets, absolute quantty targets, 
absolute and relatve quantty 
targets, only expenditure targets, 
Type
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dk, rf
(b) Can you describe some of the challenges you face in meetng 
the targets?
(c) How ofen do you meet these targets? Do you think they are 
tough?
Note: If the manager replies they have EU ETS/CCA targets, ask  
"have these been translated into internal targets for  
management?"
1-5, dk, rf Low No targets.
Mid Targets exist but seem easy to achieve.
High Evidence that targets are hard to achieve. Detailed.
(d) By approximately how much does this require reducing your 
current energy consumpton in the next 5 years (10%, 25%, 50%)?
Note the tmetable for the target (e.g. 5 years or other number  
given by interviewee).
percentage, dk, rf, na
number, dk, rf, na Horizon (number of years)
(e) Since when do you have these targets? 2000 and earlier, list of years 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
19. GHG monitoring
(a) Do you explicitly monitor your GHG emissions?  Since when?
(b) How do you estmate your GHG emissions?
(c) Are your GHG estmates externally validated? 
1-5, dk, rf Low No specifc GHG monitoring.
Mid Detailed energy monitoring with clear evidence for carbon accountng 
(at least frm level). Manager is aware that energy fgures need to be 
scaled by carbon intensity.
High Carbon accountng of both direct and indirect emissions (supply chain 
emissions). External validaton of GHG fgures.
2000 and earlier, list of years 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
Start date (put “na” if score is “1”)
20. Targets on GHG emissions for management
(a) Do you have any targets on GHG emissions which management 
has to observe? 
no targets, direct emissions, 
indirect and direct, dk, rf
(b) Can you describe some of the challenges you face in meetng 
the targets?
(c) How ofen do you meet these targets? Do you think they are 
tough?
Note: If the manager replies they have EU ETS/CCA targets, ask:  
1-5, dk, rf Low No targets for GHG emissions.
Mid There is some awareness of the contributon of diferent energy sources 
and producton processes to emissions, but this is a secondary 
consideraton to cost focused energy targets. There is some degree of 
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Have these been translated into internal targets for management? difculty in the targets. 
HIgh There are separate targets for GHGs, distnct from energy use. GHG 
emissions are a KPI (Key Performance Indicator) for the frm. The 
contributon of each energy source and the producton process to GHG 
emissions is known and suggested improvement projects for the 
producton are assessed on their potental impact on carbon as well as 
energy efciency.
(d) By approximately how much do these targets require you to 
reduce your emissions in the next 5 years (10%, 25%, 50%) 
compared their current level?
Note the tmetable for the target (e.g. 5 years or other number  
given by interviewee)
percentage, dk, rf, na
number, dk, rf, na Horizon (number of years)
(e) When did you start having targets on GHG emissions? 2000 and earlier, list of years 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
21. Target enforcement
(a) What happens if energy consumpton or GHG emission targets 
are not met? 
(b) Do you publicize targets and target achievement within the 
frm or to the public? Can you give examples? 
(c) Are there fnancial consequences in case of non-achievement? 
(d) Is there a bonus for target achievement?
1-5,dk,rf Low No targets or missing targets do not trigger any response. 
Mid Both target achievement and non-achievement are internally and 
externally communicated. 
High Target non-achievement leads to fnancial consequences internally 
and/or externally; including penaltes, e.g. staf does not get bonus.
22. Emission-reducing measures
(a) Can you tell me what measures you have adopted in order to 
reduce GHG emissions (or energy consumpton) on this site?
DO NOT PROMPT with the list if doesn't have an idea, rather ask: 
Have you bought any new equipment, or have you changed the 
way you produce?
List of tckboxes I. Heatng and cooling:
1- Optmised use of process heat
2- Modernisaton of cooling/refrigeraton system
3- Optmisaton of air conditoning system
4- Optmisaton of exhaust air system and/or district heatng system
II. More climate-friendly energy generaton on site:
1- Installaton of combined heat and power (CHP) plant / cogeneraton
2- Biogas feed-in in local combined heat and power plant or domestc gas grid
3- Switching to natural gas
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4- Exploitaton of renewable energy source
III. Machinery:
1- Modernisaton of compressed air system
2- Other industry-specifc producton process optmisaton/machine upgrade
3- Producton process innovaton
IV. Energy management:
1- Introducton of energy management system
2- Submetering / upgrade of an existng energy management system
3- (External) Energy audit
4- Installaton of tmers atached to machinery
5- Installaton of (de-)centralised heatng systems
V. Other measures on producton site:
1- Modernisaton of lightng system
2- Energy-efcient site extension/improved insulaton/introducton of building 
management
3- Employee awareness campaigns and staf trainings
4- Non-technical reorganisaton of producton process
5- Installaton of energy-efcient IT-system
6- Improved waste management/recycling
VI. Beyond producton on site:
1- Introducton of climate-friendly commutng scheme
2- Consideraton of climate-related aspects in investment and purchase 
decisions
3- Consideraton of climate-related aspects in distributon
4- Customer educaton programme
5- Partcipaton in carbon ofsetng schemes
(b) Which one of these measures achieved the largest carbon 
saving?
measure code Fill in the code corresponding to the measure in (a) (e.g. II-4 for “Exploitaton of  
renewable energy source”).
(c) By how much did this measure reduce your total energy 
consumpton?
percentage, dk, rf, na
(d) By how much did this measure reduce your total GHG 
emissions?
percentage, dk, rf, na
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(e) What motvated the adopton of these measures? EU ETS, energy cost saving / high 
proftability, polluton reducton, 
reputaton, customer pressure, 
employee initatve, public 
investment support, compliance 
with regulaton, compliance with 
expected future regulaton, other, 
dk, rf, na
Main motvaton (select only ONE)
text Other motvaton (if not in tck boxes, or second)
(f) How did you learn about this measure? consultant, government, customer, 
supplier, employee, R&D project, 
compettor, other, dk, rf, na
Tick more than one opton, if diferent sources mentoned
(g) When did you implement this measure? 2000 and earlier, list of years 2001-
2010, dk, rf, na
VI. Innovaton, barriers to investment and management
23. Climate change related process innovaton
(a) Do you dedicate staf tme and/or fnancial resources  to 
fnding new ways of reducing the GHG emissions at your facility? 
Did you commission any studies for that purpose?
(b) Can you give examples? 
(c) What fracton of your frm's global Research & Development 
funds are used for that? (less than 10%, more than 10%?)
Note: This does not include expenses for staf trainings or energy  
monitoring, but actual innovaton.
1-5, dk, rf Low No R&D resources commited to reducing GHG emissions.
Mid Evidence of R&D projects to reduce emissions. 
High Evidence that this kind of R&D is an important component in the 
company's R&D portolio (5 or higher).
24. Barriers to adoptng energy-efciency investments
(a) Can you give one example of a measure to enhance energy 
efciency which was considered, but eventually not adopted?
List of tckboxes Same list as for queston 22a.
(b) Which payback tme was required in the economic evaluaton 
of this measure?
number, dk, rf, na “Years”; if in months, put equivalent in years, e.g. record 6 months as 0.5.
Questons Values Coding descripton
(c) Is this payback tme longer or shorter than the one applied to 
non-energy related measures to cut costs?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low Longer, i.e. much less stringent
Mid Equal
High Shorter, i.e. much more stringent
(d) If diferent: why? text 
(e) Was uncertainty about future prices or regulaton important 
for the decision to reject?
no, yes_prices, yes_regulaton, 
yes_both, dk, rf, na
(f) What other factors were infuental in the decision? text
(g) Has the current economic downturn afected your investment 
criteria for clean technologies? How?
no, favors clean, favours other, 
more stringent overall, less 
stringent overall, dk, rf, na
25. Further reductons
(a) By how much (in percentage points) could you - at current 
energy prices - further reduce your current GHG emissions 
without compromising your economic performance? (i.e. how 
much more emission reducton could be achieved without 
increasing costs)
percentage, dk, rf
(b) If so, why have you not implemented these measures yet? text
(c) What further GHG emission reducton (in percentage points) 
would be technologically possible (although not necessarily at no 
extra cost)? 
percentage, dk, rf Notes: Assuming that producton stays constant and that no processes are 
being outsourced. This should not include emission reducton achieved by 
switching to renewable electricity. Include emissions reductons through 
combined heat and power however. 
26. Manager responsible for Climate Change issues
(a) At the management level, who is responsible for dealing with 
climate change policies and energy and polluton reducton in the 
frm natonally? What is the ofcial job ttle?
Note: If several, ask for highest-ranking. If nobody, put ttle “no  
clear responsibility”.
text Job ttle of the manager 
Questons Values Coding descripton
(b) How far in the management hierarchy is this manager below 
the CEO? (fgure out through sequental questoning if necessary)
CEO, number, no clear 
responsibility, dk, rf
No of people between CEO and Manager, e.g. if reports directly to CEO, put 0
(c) Has there recently been a change in responsibilites for climate 
change issues? When?
(d) How far in the management hierarchy was this manager below 
the CEO? (fgure out through sequental questoning if necessary)
no change, list of years 2000-2010, 
yes dk year, dk, rf
CEO, number, no clear 
responsibility, dk, rf
text Record past manager ttle if mentoned, but do not prompt for it.
VI. Firm Characteristcs
27. Firm/Plant Details
(a) How many people are employed in the frm globally (including 
this country)?
Note: If a multnatonal, ask for the whole group's number.
number, dk, rf
(b) How many people does the frm employ in your country? number, dk, rf
(c) How many people are employed at the current site? number, dk, rf
(d) Annual Energy Bill-Annual: number, dk, rf
percentage, dk, rf, na
percentage, dk, rf, na
Do not ask, but in case interviewee does not know the absolute number and  
answers with one of the following:
Energy cost as percentage of turnover
Energy cost as percentage of costs
(e) Total annual running costs (wage cost + materials, including 
energy):
number, dk, rf
 Answered (d) and (e) at the site level or at the company level? site, company, na
(f) Does your company purchase renewable power? yes, no, dk, rf Note: Do not include electricity generated on site.
(g) Does this site do any product R & D?
Note: Do not dwell on this queston, make a judgement from frst  
answer.
yes, no, dk, rf
(h) Is Marketng for your products done from this site?
Note: Do not dwell on this queston, make a judgement from frst  
answer.
yes, no, dk, rf
(i) Does this site have an environmental management system (ISO yes, no, dk, rf 
Questons Values Coding descripton
14000)?
VII. Country-specifc policies
UNITED KINGDOM
UK.1 Participation in voluntary government climate change policies
(a) Are you aware of voluntary government schemes to help 
businesses reduce GHG polluton?
(b) Which ones?
(c) Are you partcipatng in any?
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
Carbon Trust Online Tools (Benchmarking Tools, Acton Plan Tool) When?
Carbon Trust Energy Audit or Advice? (CTaudit)
Innovaton grants from the Carbon Trust? When?
Carbon Trust Standard
Enhanced Capital Allowance scheme? (ECA)
UK.2 Participation in Climate Change agreement
(a) Is your company (or parts thereof) subject to a UK Climate
Change Agreement?
(b) Since when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
(c) How stringent is the target imposed by the CCA?
(d) Can you describe some of the measures you had to put in 
place to comply with the cap?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low No targets.
Mid Targets exist but seem easy to achieve.
High Evidence that targets are hard to achieve. Detailed descripton of serious 
problems in achieving targets.
((e) Did you buy or sell emission rights via the UK ETS? no because of image concerns, no 
because no capacity, no other, 
bought, sold, both, dk, rf, na
BELGIUM
B.1 Partcipaton in industry agreements (accords de 
Branche/Bechmarkconvenanten)
no, list of years 2001-2009, dk, rf, 
na
Questons Values Coding descripton
(a) Is your company (or parts thereof) subject to an industry 
agreement?
(b) Since when?
(c) How stringent is the target imposed by the agreement?
(d) Can you describe some of the measures you had to put in 
place to comply with the cap?
1-5, dk, rf, na Low
Mid
High
No targets.
Targets exist but seem easy to achieve.
Evidence that targets are hard to achieve. Detailed descripton of serious 
problems in achieving targets.
B.2 Do you beneft from any tax reducton from the Federal 
government because of investments that reduce energy 
consumpton/loss? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
B.3 Brussels: Have you had a grant for an energy audit or advice 
fnanced by the Brussels region? If yes, when?
Walloon: Have you had any energy audit (AMURE) or advice 
fnanced by the Walloon region? If yes, when?
Flanders: Have you received any advice or energy audit fnanced 
by VLAO (Vlaams Agentschap Ondernemen)? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
B.4 Brussels: Have you benefted from an investment subsidy from 
the Brussels region for improving your building's or producton 
process's energy efciency ? If yes, when?
Walloon: Have you had a grant from the energy fund of the 
Walloon region for improving your building's or producton 
process's energy efciency? If yes, when?
Flanders: Have you received an ecological grant (Ecologipremeie) 
of the Flemish region for improving your building's or producton 
process's energy efciency? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
B.5 Flanders: Do you have a heat and power certfcate from the 
Flemish region (warmtekrachtcertfcaat)? If yes, since when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
FRANCE
F1. Are you part of the AERES (Associaton des entreprises pour la 
réducton de l'efet de serre) and have signed up to voluntary GHG 
emission reductons? If yes, since when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
F2. Have you had a grant for an energy audit or advice fnanced by 
ADEME? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Questons Values Coding descripton
F3. Have you benefted from a “FOGIME” guarantee for loans you 
have taken to invest into energy efciency improvements or 
emission reductons ? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
F4. Have you benefted from a grant from ADEME for improving 
your building's or producton process's energy efciency ? If yes, 
when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
GERMANY
G.1 Renewable Energy Sources Act
(a) In previous year, have you been granted a discount on your 
energy cost which reduces the energy cost apportonment 
embodied in the Renewable Energy Sources Act?
no, yes, dk, rf, na
(b) Have you applied for the discount (also) in 2009? no, yes, dk, rf, na 
(c) Did the certfcaton process require you to upgrade your 
energy management system?
Note: Since 2009 the approval of the discount is subject to the  
certfcaton of your energy management system by 30 June 2009. 
yes, no upgrade necessary, no had 
certfcate before, dk, rf, na 
G.2 Public support programmes
Have you partcipated in public support programs aimed at saving 
energy or at reducing GHG emissions?
 
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Climate initatve
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
ERP Environment and Energy Efciency Programme 
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Grant for independent energy audit from fonds for energy efciency in SME
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Provision of cut-rate investment credit from fonds for energy efciency in SME 
to implement identfed energy-saving measures 
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Support scheme of a federal state
text Other
Questons Values Coding descripton
HUNGARY
H1. Have you received government support for any of your 
investments to reduce emissions or implement energy efciency 
measures or increase the use of renewables? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
Környezetvédelmi Alap Célelőirányzat
H2.(a) Have you received EU funds to support any of your 
investments to reduce emissions or implement energy efciency 
measures or increase the use of renewables? If yes, when?
(b) If yes, for which Operatve Program;  which call for proposal? 
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
KEOP, KIOP, ERFA, dk, rf, na
H3. Have you received funding from the Norwegian Fund for 
support? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
EGT és Norvég Finanszírozási Mechanizmusok program
POLAND
P.1 Do you use the sectoral informaton brochures published by 
the Ministry of Environment that include the informaton about 
the best available technologies for diferent economic actvity? 
Since when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
P.2 Have you ever taken a technological credit provided by the 
Technological Credit Fund? If yes. when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
P.3 Have you ever been co-fnanced or have taken a preferental 
credit from the Natonal Fund of Environmental Protecton and 
Water Management, Bank of Environmental Protecton and 
EkoFund? If yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
P.4 Have you ever benefted from the subventons and tax 
reductons from the government for environmental purposes?  If 
yes, when?
no, list of years 2001-2009, yes dk 
year. dk, rf, na
VIII. Post Interview
Interview duraton (mins) number Minutes
Interviewers' impression of interviewee's reliability 1-5, dk, rf Low Some knowledge about his site, and no knowledge about the rest of the 
frm.
Questons Values Coding descripton
Mid
High
Expert knowledge about his site, and some knowledge about the rest of 
the frm.
Expert knowledge about his site and the rest of the frm.
Interviewee seemed concerned about climate change 1-5, dk, rf Low
Mid
High
Not concerned.
Somewhat.
Very concerned.
Interviewee seemed skeptc about acton on climate change 1-5, dk, rf Low
Mid
High
Not skeptc at all.
Somewhat skeptc.
Very skeptc.
Mentoned other climate change related policies text
Moaned a lot about high energy prices no, a litle, a lot
Number of tmes interview needed to be rescheduled number
Seniority of interviewee Director, VP/General Manager, 
Plant/Factory Manager, 
Manufacturing/Producton 
Manager, (Environmental), Health 
& Safety Manager, Technician
Age of interviewee
Note: Do not ask, guess!
number
Gender of interviewee male, female
Interview language English, French, German, Dutch, 
Hungarian, Polish
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